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Abstract 
 
This paper uses matched employer-employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS98) to estimate influences on managerial and employee perceptions 
of the employee relations climate. 
 Both the strength and direction of union effects differ according to the nature of the 
union and employer responses to it.  Employee and employer perceptions of climate differ 
according to the strength of the union, bargaining arrangements adopted, and managerial 
attitudes to union membership.  Employees’ perceptions of climate are also strongly 
associated with employees’ perceptions of union effectiveness. 
 
 
JEL Classifications:  J51, J53 
Key Words:  Trades unions; industrial relations climate; employee relations; matched employer-employee data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is produced under the ‘Future of Trade Unions in Modern Britain’ Programme 
supported by the Leverhulme Trust.  The Centre for Economic Performance acknowledges 
with thanks, the generosity of the Trust.  For more information concerning this Programme 
please e-mail future of unions@lse.ac.uk 
  
Union Effects On Managerial and Employee 
Perceptions of Employee Relations in Britain 
 
Alex Bryson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2001 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London  WC2A 2AE 
 
Ó Alex Bryson, submitted March 2001 
 
ISBN 0 7530 1466 1 
 
Individual copy price:  £5 
  
Union Effects On Managerial and Employee 
Perceptions of Employee Relations in Britain 
 
Alex Bryson 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Theoretical Links Between Aspects of Unionisation and the Climate of 
 Employee Relations  4 
2.1 Background 4 
2.2 Hypotheses 7 
 
3. The Data 11 
3.1 Climate measures 12 
3.2 Workplace- level measures of trade unionism 12 
3.3 Control variables for analyses of managerial perceptions of the 
employee relations climate 17 
3.4 Control variables for analyses of employee perceptions of the employee 
 relations climate 20 
 
4. Analysis 21 
4.1 The samples 21 
4.2 Modelling procedures 22 
 
5. Results 23 
5.1 Employer perceptions of climate 23 
5.2 Employee perceptions of climate 25 
 
6. Conclusions  28 
 
Appendix Tables 30 
References 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council.
  
Acknowledgments 
 
I acknowledge the Department of Trade and Industry, the Economic and Social Research 
Council, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and the Policy Studies Institute 
as the originators of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey data, and The Data 
Archive at the University of Essex as the distributor of the data.  I also thank the Department 
of Trade and Industry for funding the project which led to this paper.  None of these 
organisations bears any responsibility for my analysis and interpretations of the data. 
 
Alex Bryson is a member of the Centre for Economic Performance and of the Policy Studies 
Institute.  Comments on this paper are very welcome and can be sent to the author at the 
Policy Studies Institute, 100 Park Village East, London NW1 or via e-mail to 
a.bryson@psi.org.uk 
 
 
 1.  Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the question:  what impact do trade unions have on the employee 
relations climate in Britain?  The motivation for the paper is to shed light on differences in 
the perceptions of employers and employees in the same workplaces, and to consider the 
policy implications. 
Until recently, most analyses of attitudes towards the employee relations climate in 
Britain were based on data about workplaces gathered primarily from managerial 
respondents, such as the long-running series of Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
(WIRS) (Fernie, Metcalf and Woodland, 1994; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Wood and de 
Menezes, 1998; Moreton, 1999).  This began to change in the late 1990s, with analyses of 
employee data from the British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSAS) (Bryson and McKay, 1997; 
Bryson, 1999) and the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) (Cully et al., 
1999; Scholarios et al., 1999).  The WERS98 data offer a unique in-sight into the employee 
relations climate in Britain because they contain similar measures of perceptions of climate 
for employees and employers working in the same workplaces.  The distribution of responses 
from management and employees is presented in Table 1.  It is apparent that employees have 
poorer perceptions of workplace employee relations than their managerial counterparts.1  
Nevertheless, over half viewed the employee relations climate at their workplace as ‘very 
good’ or ‘good’. 
 
Table 1:  Ratings of Management-Employee Relations in 1998 
 Employees Management 
Very good 15  42 
Good 40 48 
Neither good nor poor 27 8 
Poor 12 2 
Very poor 6 1 
   
Weighted base 27,659   2185 
Unweighted base 27,691  2188 
 
Note:  In a self-completion questionnaire, employees were asked:  ‘In general, how would you describe relations 
between managers and employees here?’  The employee base is all employees excluding 524 unweighted cases 
with missing data.  In a face-to-face interview, the senior manager with responsibility for personnel was asked:  
‘Finally, looking at this scale, how would you rate the relationship between management and employees 
generally at this workplace?’
                                                 
1 If, as seems possible, employee relations were poorer in those workplaces where management refused 
permission to distribute the employee questionnaires, then the ‘real’ gap may be wider.  However, our weighting 
scheme compensates for sample non-response.  We believe that survey procedures conveying the confidentiality 
of information provided by employees were sufficiently rigorous to discount the possibility that employees’ 
responses were affected by the possibility of management reprisals. 
2 
Table 2 presents this information in a different way, restricting the comparison to 
those instances in which data are available for both employees and the employer.  It shows 
that, while employee perceptions of climate were poorer than managers’ perceptions in nearly 
half of all cases, both parties agreed in one-third of cases and managers’ ratings were poorer 
in 14 per cent of cases.2 
 
Table 2:  Agreement on the Climate of Employee Relations 
 % 
Manager’s rating worse by one point 12 
Manager’s rating worse by more than one point 2 
Both parties agree 33 
Employee’s rating worse by one point 31 
Employee’s rating worse by more than one point 23 
  
Weighted base 27,625 
Unweighted base 27,673 
 
Note:  Includes all employees where there are non-missing data for the employee and employer perceptions of 
climate. 
 
There are a number of reasons why employee perceptions of management-employee 
relations differ from those of their employer.  First, our main managerial respondents have 
formal responsibility for employee relations at the workplace and, with that authority, should 
have the opportunity to influence conditions at work in a way that the average worker can 
not.  Employees in general may be less constrained in their criticism of workplace relations 
than managers who are more directly responsible for them.  Secondly, employees’ 
perceptions may differ from their employer’s because their perspectives are influenced by 
different factors.  As well as making judgements with different information sets3, employees’ 
perceptions are likely to be influenced by factors such as their general feelings about what 
their workplace is like to work in (Cully et al., 1999:  280-281), their feelings about the 
effectiveness of their union, and how they view their own management.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that employee perceptions of climate do not match the perceptions of their 
employers.  Our purpose in this paper is to assess the contribution of unions and attitudes 
towards unions in explaining these differences. 
                                                 
2 These data differ from those presented by Cully et al. (1999:  283) because they relate to all employees with 
non-missing data in the survey, whereas Cully et al. confine their analyses to non-managerial employees in 
workplaces with 25 or more employees. 
3 For instance, workers may be more aware of the ‘real’ feeling on the shopfloor than management, whereas 
management may be privy to all formal grievances and disputes in a way that most employees will not. 
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Our findings provide a context in which to appraise the impact of a new piece of 
legislation.  The Fairness at Work White Paper (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998), 
launched by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in May 1998, argued that effective 
unions are conducive to good employee relations.  Moreover it claimed that harmonious 
employee relations based on partnership between workers and their employer improve both 
the working lives of individuals and the performance of organisations.  However, the 
government also went on to argue that these benefits may be jeopardised if, against the 
wishes of their employees, employers refuse to recognise a union for pay bargaining and 
worker representation.  Accordingly, the White Paper proposed a procedure under which an 
employer might be compelled to recognise trade unions where a majority of employees so 
wish.  The statutory recognition procedure was contained in the Employment Relations Act 
1999, and has been in effect since 6 June 2000.4 As our data were obtained at a time when 
employers were still at liberty to decide for themselves whether or not to recognise unions, it 
is not possible to infer directly from our results whether the new statutory provisions will 
improve workplace governance.5 Even if we were to find that the presence of recognised 
trade unions was associated with good employee relations, we would have to acknowledge 
that forcing an employer to recognise a union against their wishes could well sour employee 
relations rather than improve them.  Indeed, some critics of the new legislation have pointed 
to the failure of previous statutory arrangements for union recognition introduced in the early 
1970s, suggesting that it demonstrated that compelling employers to deal with trades unions 
will be damaging to the conduct of employee relations (Confederation of British Industry, 
1998).  However, our analysis can shed light on two issues that are fundamental to any 
consideration of the links between unions and workplace governance, irrespective of the 
statutory environment.  The first is whether the presence of recognised unions has a 
beneficial effect on governance and, if so, under what circumstances.  As we detail further 
below, evidence has emerged recently that the influence of unions is diminishing even where, 
at least nominally, they continue to be granted recognition rights.  There are theoretical 
grounds for suspecting that this development will adversely affect workplace relations.  The 
second issue we can illuminate is whether the impact of unions depends on how management 
                                                 
4 Under the legislation, employers with more than 20 employees are required to recognise unions for bargaining 
on pay, hours and holidays if a majority of relevant workers demonstrate support for it. To achieve recognition, 
a union must show in a secret ballot that it has the support of 40 per cent of those working in the bargaining unit, 
as well as a majority of those voting.  Alternatively, the union can demonstrate that more than half of the 
workers in the unit are union members. 
 4
reacts to them.  We contend that good employee relations can only be fashioned with the 
support of management and workers:  it is not simply a gift to be bestowed by one side or the 
other, no matter how willing they may be. 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows.  Section 2 discusses trends in unionisation 
and employer and employee orientations to unions that may have a bearing on union 
influence over workplace governance.  It goes on to outline theoretical links between unions 
and the employee relations climate and the five hypotheses tested in the paper.  In Section 3 
we introduce the WERS98 data used in our analyses.  Section 4 discusses our analytical 
approach.  Results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical Links Between Aspects of Unionisation and the Climate of 
Employee Relations 
 
2.1  Background 
 
The last two decades have been a period of continuous decline for trade unions in Britain.  
The unionised sector shrank due to falls in membership and a rapid drop in the number of 
employers recognising unions for collective bargaining (Millward et al., 2000; Machin, 
2000).  But the issue at the heart of this paper is:  what influence do unions have where they 
retain a foothold in the workplace?  We focus on four aspects of unionisation which may 
influence both the size and direction of union effects on the climate of employee relations.  
These are union strength, bargaining arrangements, managerial support for unions, and the 
effectiveness of unions as perceived by employees. 
Union strength:  Unions’ influence in the workplace derives, in large part, from their 
bargaining power, stemming from their ability to disrupt the supply of labour in pursuance of 
their members’ interests.  But it also comes from the union’s role as the representative ‘voice’ 
of employees in the resolution of workplace grievances and disputes.  Both sources of 
influence depend on the credibility of the union in claiming to represent the workforce.  This 
has diminished since the early 1980s.  Even where unions continue to be recognised by the 
employer for bargaining purposes, there has been a decline in the proportion of employees 
                                                 
5 For an attempt to do so using historical and international comparative analysis see Wood and Godard (1999). 
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whose terms and conditions are set by collective bargaining and the proportion who are union 
members (Millward et al., 2000).  This may explain the absence of a general union wage 
mark-up (Forth and Millward, 2000) and, by 1998, the disappearance of negative union 
effects on workplace financial performance usually attributed to the monopoly power of 
unions (Addison and Belfield, 2000; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001).  
However, the decline in these ‘average’ union effects for some workplace outcomes is 
by no means the whole story.  First, some average union effects remain powerful.  For 
instance, unionised workplaces had slower growth rates than non-unionised workplaces in the 
1990s, ceteris paribus, suggesting that union effects are not benign (Bryson, 2001a). 
Secondly, many workplaces still have ‘strong’ unions with high membership, high bargaining 
coverage and on-site lay representation (Millward et al., 2000:  179-183).  One might expect 
the ‘returns’ to well-organised, or strong, unions to be relatively greater now that average 
union strength has declined.  Forth and Millward (2000) confirm this in their analyses of the 
union wage premium.  They found that, by 1998, there was no general union premium, but 
there was a sizeable mark-up in workplaces with high bargaining coverage.  Thirdly, as 
discussed in greater detail below, even weak unions may still have appreciable effects on 
employee perceptions of climate.  
Bargaining arrangements:  Bargaining arrangements refer to the ways in which 
unions and employers are organised for bargaining purposes.  An individual union may 
negotiate separately for different groups of workers but, in the main, the number of 
recognised unions at a workplace sets a limit on the number of separate bargaining groups.  
Separate unions may negotiate together.  Where all recognised unions negotiate together this 
is known as ‘single-table bargaining’. 
During the 1990s, there was a major switch away from separate bargaining to joint 
bargaining in workplaces where collective bargaining was the dominant form of pay 
determination (Millward et al., 2000:  203).  In 1990, only 40 per cent of these workplaces 
had single bargaining units.  This had risen to 77 per cent in 1998.  The principle cause of the 
trend to single-table bargaining was not the reduction in multi-unionism which occurred over 
the period, but a simplification of bargaining arrangements where more than one union 
existed (Millward et al., 2000:  204).  The change was the result of behavioural change in 
workplaces which continued in operation over the period, coupled with the near universal 
adoption of single-table bargaining among unionised workplaces that had come into being 
since 1990 and those growing above the 25-employee threshold used for sampling in the 
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WIRS series.  If these trends continue, single-table bargaining will become still more 
prevalent. 
Bargaining structures are not simply determined by unions.  Indeed, when Millward et 
al. (2000) investigated the reasons why continuing workplaces had shifted to single-table 
bargaining, they concluded that ‘many, if not most, of the moves towards simpler negotiating 
arrangements were at the instigation of management’ (Millward et al., 2000:  205).  This 
implies that employers feel they had something to gain from simpler bargaining 
arrangements:  these gains might include a better employee relations climate. 
Management attitudes to unions:  What has caused the general decline in the ‘take-
up’ of unions among employees and employers, lies beyond the scope of this paper.6  
However, as discussed below, employer support for unions and employee perceptions of the 
job done by unions may be important in explaining the effects of unions on perceptions of 
workplace governance.  Trends in these two factors provide useful background to the 
discussion of their effects on climate below. 
Where employers are at liberty to choose whether they recognise trade unions, unions 
are heavily reliant on the support, or at least acquiescence, of management, to conduct their 
business in representing members.  This was the case for the period up to 1998 for which we 
have data.7  However, employees are less likely to think that their employer endorses union 
membership than they were in the mid-1980s (Bryson, 2001b; Gallie et al, 1998:  107)).  
Survey evidence from managers in workplaces recognising unions shows that, while 
management endorsement of union membership rose in the 1980s, partly offsetting the 
decline in the closed shop, endorsement of membership declined markedly in the 1990s, 
along with a decline in the closed shop (Millward et al., 2000:  145-149).  Union 
derecognition was relatively rare over the period (Millward et al., 2000:  103-104).  Instead, 
where employers continue to recognise unions, they appear to be capitalising on changes in 
the labour market and the legal framework which have strengthened their bargaining power 
vis-à-vis employees to refashion their relationship with organised labour.  In 1998, a clear 
majority of managers in workplaces recognising unions expressed a preference for consulting 
directly with employees rather than with unions (Bryson, 2001c).  This is consistent with case 
studies uncovering instances in which recognised unions are by-passed in managerial 
                                                 
6 For discussion of this issue see Millward et al., 2000; Metcalf, 2000; Machin, 2000. 
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decision-making (Marchington and Parker, 1990; Darlington, 1994), and evidence from 
WERS98 on ‘the extent to which worker representatives were excluded altogether from the 
province of many workplace issues’ (Cully et al., 1999:  105).  
Union effectiveness:  These considerations may lead us to suspect that managers are 
less constrained than they were in the 1980s in pursuing corporate goals, sometimes at the 
expense of employees.  Consequently, other things being equal, employee representations to 
management may be less influential in the governance of the workplace.  However, evidence 
from BSAS indicates that employees are no more likely to view unions as ineffective in the 
late 1990s than they were in the early 1980s (Bryson, 2001c). 
 
2.2  Hypotheses 
 
Relations between unions and employers are often portrayed as a ‘zero-sum game’, where 
union members benefit at the expense of employers, and vice versa.  However, there is theory 
and evidence to indicate that both workers and employers can benefit from unions under 
certain conditions.  Unions may have offsetting influences on climate arising from their dual 
function in bargaining on behalf of members for improved pay and conditions, on the one 
hand, and in representing the ‘voice’ of workers to management on the other.  Consequently, 
their actual impact on climate is a matter for empirical investigation.  Below we outline five 
hypotheses tested in the paper which suggest ways in which unionisation may affect 
employer and employee perceptions of climate. 
 
First hypothesis:  Managers perceive the workplace employee relations climate to be better 
where they deal with a unified worker voice able to represent the majority of workers.  
However, where unions are particularly strong, managers will perceive climate to be poorer. 
 
Managers are likely to view the climate poorly where strong unions use their 
bargaining power to take a greater share of profits at the expense of the firm8, particularly 
where this results in conflict or discord.  On the other hand, unions can operate as effective 
                                                 
7 Although statutory rights to recognition under the Employee Relations Act 1999 diminish reliance on 
employers for formal recognition, in practice it is likely that unions will remain reliant on employer support if 
they are to make effective representations on behalf of their members. 
8 Pay bargaining may have similar effects in the public sector where wage demands must be satisfied, along with 
competing claims for resources, from fixed budgets set by officials and politicians. 
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agents for management in enforcing desired effort in return for agreed rewards, and in 
delivering worker compliance with management-initiated change.  However, they can only 
do this where they are perceived by management and employees as the legitimate 
representative of the employees’ voice.  From this principle-agent perspective, it makes little 
sense for employers to maintain ineffectual unions, since unions require influence if they are 
to reduce employers’ agency costs in maintaining and enforcing desired levels of worker 
effort.9 Unions can also contribute to better management perceptions of climate where they 
are effective in communicating and seeking to resolve employee grievances (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984).  Weak unions may have a particularly negative influence on managerial 
perceptions of climate, arising from the frustration in having to deal with a union which is not 
capable of operating as an effective voice or agent. 
Analysis of the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey showed that managerial 
perceptions of climate were ‘worse where the strong and weak versions of unionisation exist 
than it is in non-union workplaces or those with middling union strength’ (Fernie and 
Metcalf, 1995:  401).  The authors suggest that ‘the benefits from having a union representing 
the bulk of the labour force in a workplace ... flow from greater voice and representativeness 
and less fragmentation of workplace employee relations’ (Fernie and Metcalf, op. cit.).  This 
may have remained so in the late 1990s, even though declines in union density and 
bargaining coverage meant fewer workers were represented by union voice where it was 
present.  We test whether this was the case in 1998 with our union strength and bargaining 
arrangement measures, described later.  
 
Second hypothesis:  Employees’ perceptions of climate will be best where unions have 
sufficient strength to represent their voice to management. 
 
Genuine co-operation between management and employees seems unlikely if 
employees have no access to independent sources of power to represent them and protect 
their interests.  Marshall (1992) argues that co-operative relations cannot be maintained 
where there is a substantial power imbalance between management and unions because the 
stronger party will opt for unilateral control over co-operation.  Where unions are weak, and 
employers are tempted to exercise unilateral control, employees may be less trusting in 
                                                 
9 Also, distributive bargaining relies on ‘interdependency’ between employer and union, at least in the long run 
(Walton and McKersie, 1965). 
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management and perceptions of climate may be poor.  
Whereas particularly strong unions may be associated with poorer managerial 
perceptions of climate, strong unions are unlikely to have this effect on employees’ 
perceptions.  Indeed, if strong unions are best able to deliver better terms and conditions for 
employees, this may result in better employee perceptions of the working environment than 
might otherwise be the case. 
Analyses of BSAS indicate that employees’ perceptions of climate are indeed poorest 
where unions are weak, and they are at least as good as perceptions in non-unionised 
workplaces where employees think union power in the workplace is ‘about right’ (Bryson, 
2001c). 
 
Third hypothesis:  Employee perceptions of climate are no worse, and may even be better, 
where voice is fragmented, than they are where there is a unified worker voice. 
 
Although employers may benefit from a single, unified worker voice, this may not be 
the case for employees.  It may well be that employees’ interests can be adequately 
represented through a single union, or multiple unions operating in concert.  But if workers 
are heterogeneous, multiple unions operating separately may better represent their needs.  In 
practice, single unionism may be particularly unsuited to meeting the majority of employees’ 
needs because it is associated with lower union density and bargaining coverage than 
multiple unionism (Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001).  This may help to explain why, by 1998, 
the union wage premium in Britain was confined to workers in multiple union workplaces  
(Forth and Millward, 2000). 
It is also possible that non-union voice mechanisms such as direct two-way 
communication between management and employees, can complement union voice and, as 
such, enhance employee perceptions of climate.  It may do so if it operates as a more efficient 
method of communication between employees and the employer, as some human resource 
management academics suggest (Storey, 1992), and where it involves employees not covered 
by union voice.  Employees’ perceptions of management improve where there is intensive 
use of direct communication methods between management and employees (Bryson, 2000).  
This is particularly so in a union setting, suggesting some complimentarity between union 
and non-union voice (op. cit.).  
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Fourth hypothesis:  Managerial and employee perceptions of workplace governance are 
better where managers support union membership, and are poorest where managers 
discourage membership. 
 
The acts or omissions of one party may be able to sour employee relations, but no 
matter how constructive a union wishes to be, or how strong it may be organisationally, a co-
operative environment is likely to require that management engages constructively with the 
union, and vice versa.  Only then can the ‘space’ for collaboration (or what is sometimes 
termed ‘concertation’ (Hyman, 1997:  323) be created.  In this sense, ‘the extent to which a 
union is a liability or an asset [for the employer] depends crucially on how management 
responds to it’ (Freeman and Medoff, 1984:  5).10  Thus, a co-operative environment is likely 
to require that management engage constructively with the union, unless it can devise non-
union employee involvement strategies that substitute for unions.  Conversely, where 
management opposes membership, a low trust relationship may ensue, resulting in a 
deterioration in perceptions of climate.  Recent evidence from analyses of BSAS shows that, 
ceteris paribus, employees’ perceptions of climate are indeed best where management 
supports membership, and are poorest were management is opposed to membership (Bryson, 
2001c).  I am aware of no evidence on the association between managerial attitudes to unions 
and managerial perceptions of climate. 
 
Fifth hypothesis:  Employees’ perceptions of climate are positively associated with 
perceptions of union effectiveness. 
 
The perception that a union is effectively protecting and advancing its members’ 
interests can result in positive perceptions of management (Deery et al, 1995).  This may 
occur where union instrumentality11 engenders greater employee allegiance to both the union 
and the employing organisation (‘dual commitment’), thus resulting in more co-operative and 
harmonious management-employee relations.  It may also occur where perceptions of union 
effectiveness are associated with perceptions of a fairer, more challenging and satisfying 
                                                 
10 Similar arguments apply to other workplace outcomes such as financial performance.  Thus, the behaviour of 
one party may be responsible for poor financial performance but, as Denny and Muellbauer (1988:  6) argue:  ‘it 
is not the independent effect of trade unions but the interaction of unions and management that can cause 
improved economic performance’. 
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work environment.  This, in turn, can positively influence perceptions of management (Deery 
et al., 1999:  546). 
Gallie et al. (1998:  72-86) find that employees perceive supervision to be tighter, and 
technical and bureaucratic methods of management control to be more evident where unions 
are perceived as having greater influence.  The authors suggest that ‘a reasonable inference, 
then, is that intensive control systems were preferred by organisations where managerial 
power was contested’ (Gallie et al., 1998:  85).  It may be that, where unions contest ‘the 
terrain’ with management, employee perceptions of the working environment actually 
deteriorate, in which case trust in management may also deteriorate.  This line of reasoning 
cautions against a simple assumption that effective unionism will translate into better 
perceptions of climate.  In fact, analyses of BSAS indicate that employees’ perceptions of 
climate are particularly poor where unions are perceived to be ineffective (Bryson, 2001c).  
Where unions are viewed as effective, perceptions of climate among employees in unionised 
workplaces did not differ from the perceptions of employees in non-unionised workplaces, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
 
3.  The Data 
 
The Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) is a nationally representative 
survey of workplaces with 10 or more employees covering all sectors of the economy except 
agriculture.12  
Our analyses use two elements of the survey.  The first is the management interview, 
conducted face-to-face with the most senior workplace manager responsible for employee 
relations.  This was supplemented by a pre-interview self-completion questionnaire providing 
workforce data that might have involved interrogating records.  Interviews were conducted in 
2191 workplaces with a response rate of 80 per cent.  The second element we use is the 
survey of employees within workplaces where a management interview was obtained.  Self-
completion questionnaires were distributed to a simple random sample of 25 employees (or 
                                                 
11 In this context, union instrumentality means ‘the degree to which the union achieves the valued goals of 
employees’ (Deery et al., 1995:  9). 
12 For a comprehensive technical account of the survey see Airey et al. (1999) and for the initial analysis of the 
survey see Cully et al. (1999).  The survey data sets are available from The Data Archive, University of Essex. 
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all employees in workplaces with 10-24) in the 1880 cases where management permitted it.13  
Of the 44,283 questionnaires distributed, 28,237 (64 per cent) usable ones were returned.14  
 
3.1  Climate measures 
 
Our climate measures are those presented in Table 1.  Others have used composite indexes of 
managerial relations derived from a number of items contained in the employee questionnaire 
when exploring employees’ perceptions of climate (Guest et al., 1999; Scholarios et al., 
1999).  Although there are advantages to moving away from reliance on a single-item 
response, I have chosen to focus on the single item to allow for comparability across the 
analyses of managerial and employee perceptions. 
 
3.2  Workplace-level measures of trade unionism 
 
Below we describe the dimensions of unionisation used in our analyses, namely union 
strength, bargaining arrangements, managerial attitudes to unions and employee perceptions 
of union effectiveness.  We also identify some of the ways in which these measures might 
relate to employee and employer perceptions of climate. 
Distributions for these variables and control variables are presented in Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2 for management and employees respectively. 
Union strength:  Union recognition by the employer for pay bargaining is the basis for 
union influence in the workplace.  Although rights to represent members in grievance 
procedures and other matters, and rights to negotiate over non-pay issues are important in 
building a membership base and allow unions some influence over workplace matters, these 
rights rarely exist without the right to negotiate over pay (Millward, 1994:  30-33).  Since 
payment is generally regarded as ‘the most conspicuous focus of collective concern for 
labour’ (Brown et al., 1995:  123), unions that are not recognised for pay bargaining purposes 
can only address issues of peripheral interest to workers collectively. 
                                                 
13 The probability of worker selection is the product of the probability of the workplace being selected and the 
probability of an employee being selected from within that workplace.  Cully et al. (1999:  306) note the 
advantages of this approach. 
14 The weighting scheme used in this paper compensates for sample non-response bias which was detected in the 
employee survey (Airey et al., 1999:  91-92). 
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When distinguishing unions according to their strength, analysts have traditionally 
compared union recognition with and without a closed shop, whereby at least some 
employees are required by the employer to be union members.  However, the closed shop has 
been in decline since the beginning of the 1980s, and is now legally unenforceable.  By 1998, 
only 2 per cent of workplaces recognising unions were maintaining a closed shop so it is not 
possible to rely on it as the single most important indicator of union strength.   
Analysts have frequently combined the closed shop and management endorsement of 
union membership as a single measure of union strength, since the recommendation of union 
membership by management may not differ substantially in practice from closed shop 
arrangements (Wright, 1996).  This is particularly so now that the closed shop is no longer 
legally enforceable in Britain.  However, management endorsement is an ambiguous measure 
of union strength because, although it may assist in the recruitment of members, thus 
strengthening a union, it may be a sign that a union is not wholly independent of 
management, and may even be reliant on management support for its position.  Therefore 
union strength and management support for unions are conceptually different.  A union may 
be strong without management support.  Where it is strong in the face of management 
opposition, the employee relations climate may be conflictual.  Where it is strong and has 
management support, climate may be better.  Therefore we prefer to treat the existence of a 
de facto closed shop and strong endorsement of union membership as measures of managerial 
attitudes towards unions, rather than measures of union strength. 
The influence the union wields in the workplace is also likely to depend on the 
proportion of employees it can count among its members.  Mean union density15 declined 
markedly in workplaces with recognised unions over the 1980s and 1990s, but there was a 
sharp increase in the rate of decline in the 1990s (Millward et al., 2000:  140-145), implying a 
considerable loss of influence in the workplace.  By 1998, it stood at 58 per cent in 
workplaces with 10 or more employees.  Higher union density may influence employer and 
employee perceptions of a union’s legitimacy in representing workers’ interests, predisposing 
them to take greater account of what the union is saying.  Where unions represent most of the 
workforce, they can represent workers’ interests with a strong ‘voice’.  Where they represent 
a minority of workers, they may lack influence over sections of the workforce.  
                                                 
15 Mean workplace-level union density is the sum of the percentage of employees in membership for each 
workplace, divided by the number of workplaces.  This measure is the one we use in our analyses.  It differs 
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Consequently, their ability to work constructively with employers may be hampered by their 
inability to deliver worker support for change.  Equally, their ability to disrupt production is 
diminished.  These considerations may explain why employers are less likely to listen to the 
union if only a minority of employees back it than if the union represents a majority voice – 
even if the employer has chosen to recognise the union (Cully et al., 1999:  105-6).  
Despite being an indicator of union strength, workplace union density has not featured 
in many analyses of the employee relations climate, primarily because of difficulties in 
interpreting its effects.  The proportion of a workforce that is unionised may be directly 
influenced by the climate of the workplace since employees’ propensity to join a union may 
be affected by the existing employee relations climate.  For instance, where climate is poor 
and workers wish for a more effective voice, they may be more inclined to join a union.  In 
this case, higher union density may be correlated with poor climate, but it is the poor climate 
which has resulted in higher density, rather than vice versa.  The second difficulty in using 
workplace-level union density is the difficulty in interpreting what union density is capturing.  
It is highly correlated with a number of other union measures, such as managerial support for 
unions, and managers’ desire to consult with unions rather than directly with employees 
(Cully et al., 1999:  90).  Despite these caveats we consider the effects of union density. 
The percentage of workers whose pay is jointly determined by employers and unions 
through collective bargaining is another fairly direct measure of union influence in the 
workplace.  By this measure, unions have lost a good deal of influence over joint regulation 
since the mid-1980s, despite being formally recognised for pay bargaining.  There has been a 
marked decline in collective bargaining coverage in unionised workplaces since 1984 
(Millward et al., 2000:  159-167).  Furthermore, for the first time, a sizeable proportion of 
workplaces with recognised unions reported having no workers covered by collective 
bargaining.  The rate of decline, and the emergence of many unionised establishments with 
no effective bargaining, have been so dramatic that commentators suggest they ‘may mark a 
qualitatively different phase in the development of unionism’ (Millward et al., 2000:  167). 
Another indicator of union organisational strength is the presence of a trade union 
representative.  Union representatives may also be viewed as ‘voice mechanisms’, operating 
as a channel for communication between local membership and management, and assisting in 
the resolution of disputes and grievances (Cully et al., 1999:  201-203).  WERS98 provides 
                                                 
from aggregate union density, the mean of which is derived by summing the members across a set of workplaces 
and then dividing by the total number of employees in those workplaces. 
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evidence that worker representatives are increasingly conforming to this role, attaching 
greater importance to ‘dealing with problems raised by the treatment of employees by 
management, and to resolving disputes’ (Cully et al., 1999:  201), rather than the more 
‘traditional’ activities of maintaining wages and benefits.  If they are effective in this role, the 
presence of representatives on-site may contribute to more positive perceptions of 
management-employee relations.16 
Bargaining arrangements:  Traditionally, bargaining arrangements are equated with 
bargaining power:  complementary workers will choose separate bargaining, while 
substitutable workers will choose joint bargaining (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988)..17  If workers 
are close substitutes they will do better by joining forces in either a single union or joint 
bargaining arrangement, helping them to avoid divide-and-rule tactics by the employer.  If 
groups of workers are highly complementary, each group is powerful under separate 
bargaining as the employer needs all groups to maintain production.  Furthermore, separate 
bargaining arrangements may permit consideration of different issues facing different groups 
of workers.  If this delivers desirable outcomes for workers, the process may result in 
increased worker motivation, improved productivity and thus performance.  Nevertheless, 
separate bargaining always carries with it the risk that employers will be able to ‘divide-and-
rule’, leading to a deterioration in employees’ perceptions of the employee relations climate.   
However, bargaining arrangements may have effects on employer and employee 
perceptions of climate that can not be reduced simply to their impact on relative bargaining 
power.  Employers may benefit when negotiating with a unified worker voice, which may 
take the form of a single union, or separate unions bargaining together.  This is attractive to 
employers when it limits the sort of inter-union rivalry in the bargaining process which 
results in ‘leapfrogging’ claims, and where it reduces the costs to employers of engaging in 
bargaining with multiple unions.  But multi-unionism may be associated with poorer 
managerial perceptions of climate, whether there is joint bargaining or not.  This may occur 
where unions are engaged in demarcation disputes, jurisdictional disputes regarding rights to 
                                                 
16 If unions were losing their organisational strength in the 1990s, one might have expected a continuation in the 
decline of on-site representation that had begun in the latter half of the 1980s.  In fact, evidence from the 
WERS98 cross-section and panel indicates that on-site representation stabilised in the 1990s, with around seven-
in-ten workplaces with 25 or more employees and a recognised union also having an on-site representative 
(Millward et al., 2000:  153-154). Among workplaces with 10 or more employees with recognised unions, 59 
per cent had an on-site representative in 1998. 
17 Naylor (1995) demonstrates why separate bargaining is associated with unions capturing more of the available 
rents at a workplace. 
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represent, membership poaching disputes, or other forms of ‘competitive militancy’, although 
it is rare in practice (Dobson, 1997).  On the other hand, multi-unionism may increase 
productivity among heterogeneous workers if it is a superior means of diagnosing and 
articulating workers’ grievances, resulting in a better climate (Metcalf, et al., 1993:  9). 
Our analyses consider the number of unions recognised for pay bargaining at the 
workplace and, where there is multi-unionism, whether they bargain jointly or separately. 
Managerial attitudes to unions:  the data contain four measures of management 
support for unions, three obtained from the management respondent, and one asked in the 
employee questionnaire. 
The following question is asked of both management and employees: 
‘How would you describe management’s general attitude towards trade union 
membership among employees at this establishment?  Is management… 
 … in favour of trade union membership 
 … not in favour of it 
 … or neutral about it?’ 
Table 3 indicates that managers view themselves as more in favour of unions than 
their employees seem to think.  Where there was no recognised union, very few managers (3 
per cent) said they were not in favour of union membership (compared to 26 per cent in 
workplaces without recognition), although over a third (36 per cent) said they were ‘neutral’ 
about it.  However, 16 per cent of employees in unionised workplaces felt that their managers 
were not in favour of union membership, a figure which would indicate a substantial degree 
of opposition to unions on the part of management. 
 
Table 3:  Management Attitudes to Unions 
 
Column percentages 
 Employees Management 
In favour 18 27 
Neutral 54 54 
Not in favour 27 17 
   
Weighted base 25313 2180 
Unweighted base 25523 2182 
 
Base:  all employees excluding ‘don’t know/not answered’ and all managerial respondents excluding ‘don’t 
know’, ‘not answered’ and ‘not an issue’. 
 
As well as asking whether any employees have to be union members to get or keep 
their jobs, which is the basis for the closed shop measure, managers are also asked:  ‘Are 
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there any employees here who management strongly recommends should be union 
members?’  This is our third measure of management attitudes to unions. 
Finally, WIRS has traditionally contained little information on how employers wish to 
work with unions at their workplace.  This gap is filled in WERS98 with a question about 
how strongly the respondent agrees with the statement:  ‘We would rather consult directly 
with employees than unions’.  Almost three-quarters of managerial respondents agreed with 
the statement.  Perhaps more revealing still is the fact that 18 per cent of managerial 
respondents in unionised workplaces agreed strongly with the statement, and a further 37 per 
cent agreed. 
Employee perceptions of union effectiveness:  WERS98 contains data on two sorts of 
union influence, as perceived by employees.  The first is perceptions of union effectiveness in 
working for employees and serving their interests.  Where employees are aware of a 
workplace union, they are asked how strongly they agree that unions at the workplace ‘take 
notice of members’ problems and complaints’.  Among those giving a valid answer, the 
percentage of members agreeing was similar across workplaces with and without recognised 
unions (72 per cent where they were recognised and 69 per cent where there was no 
recognition).  Non-members were less likely to agree, whether they worked in workplaces 
with recognised unions or not (55 and 56 per cent respectively). 
The second sort of measure is employee perceptions of the difference unions make at 
the workplace, and the influence they have over management.  Our preferred measure is 
based on how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement that unions or staff 
associations at the workplace ‘are taken seriously by management’.  Roughly half of 
employees in workplaces with 10 or more employees agree with the view that unions are 
taken seriously by management.  Although the figure is a little higher where the individual is 
a member of a recognised union, the differences are not large.18  
 
3.3  Control variables for analyses of managerial perceptions of the employee relations 
climate 
 
Appendix Table 1 defines these variables and shows their incidence in the sample, but I 
introduce them briefly below.  
                                                 
18 However, the differences are much larger when one takes account of the fact that so many non-members are 
unaware that a recognised union operates at their establishment. 
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Respondent characteristics:  I experimented with a number of variables capturing the 
nature of the managerial respondent.  The final models incorporate three.  First, since 
previous research indicated that women tend to have better perceptions of climate than men 
(Bryson and McKay, 1997) we identify whether the respondent was a woman.  Secondly, we 
include whether the respondent was a personnel or employee relations specialist since 
research with WIRS90 found specialists had poorer perceptions of climate than other 
managerial respondents (Fernie, Metcalf and Woodland, 1994).  Previous research indicates 
that employees’ perceptions of climate deteriorate with time in their job; we incorporate job 
tenure on the assumption that this effect will also apply to managers. 
Workforce composition:  Managerial perceptions of climate are better in smaller 
workplaces (Fernie, Metcalf and Woodland, 1994), so I include a categorical variable 
capturing the number of employees at the workplace.  Three additional variables capture the 
composition of the workforce:  the percentage of women, part-timers and non-white ethnic 
minorities. 
Workplace ownership, sector and location:  In the same way that smaller workplaces 
are often associated with better managerial perceptions of climate, so too are smaller 
organisations:  the distinction between workplaces which are single independent 
establishments and those belonging to multiple-establishment organisations helps capture 
this.  I also make use of information that identifies workplaces owned by individuals or 
families also involved in the day-to-day running of the workplace.  Public and private sector 
organisations differ markedly in the way they manage employee relations (Millward et al., 
2000:  61-80).  For example, their bargaining arrangements are very different.  So we control 
for this with a dummy variable.  I use the one-digit standard industrial classification to 
capture other industry-specific differences.  A twelve-category regional variable captures 
workplace location.  Although debate about the ‘new’ industrial relations has died down 
somewhat, it is still equated with younger workplaces, those set up on greenfield sites, and 
foreign-owned workplaces (Millward, 1994).  I control for these factors. 
Workplace activity:  Workplace climate may be affected by the pressures associated 
with exposure to a competitive market environment.  The workplace activity variable 
distinguishes workplaces producing goods and services for consumers, those supplying to 
other companies, those supplying to other parts of the organisation they belong to, those that 
do not produce goods or provide services for the open market, and those that are purely 
administrative offices. 
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Management practices:  If unions are more likely to gain a foothold where 
management is poor (or good) the estimates of union effects on climate may be biased since 
they may simply indicate that a workplace is poorly or well-managed (Huselid and Becker, 
1996).  I include a wide range of management practices to account for this possibility, as 
recorded in Appendix Table 1.  It is worth mentioning some of them briefly.  First, there are 
the human resource management practices.  HRMSCORE is loosely based on the managerial 
concepts outlined by Pfeffer (1995) which he argues produce a sustainable competitive 
advantage through the effective management of people.  The measure is a count of practices 
identified by Pfeffer, supplemented by other aspects of human resource management 
identifiable in the literature.19  (I have experimented with the count variable in some models; 
in others I included the full set of practices.)  Secondly, I include a range of voice and 
communication variables supplementing the union-non-union voice variable referred to 
below.  Some entail two-way communication, others one-way downward communication 
from management to employees.  The third set of management practice variables relates to 
formal procedures:  individual grievance procedures, procedures for dealing with collective 
disputes, and formal written policies on equal opportunities or managing diversity.  Finally, I 
identify whether the workplace or organisation to which it belongs has been accredited as an 
Investor in People.20  
Non-union voice:  The nature of worker voice is captured by a variable which 
distinguishes workplaces with no voice, union-only voice, direct non-union voice only, or 
‘dual channel’ voice involving a combination of union and non-union voice.21 
 
                                                 
19 These dimensions are as follows:  selectivity in recruiting (SELECTIV); employment security (JOBSECUR); 
incentive pay (PROFITPY, PERFPAY, CASHBO); employee ownership (ESOP); information sharing 
(NINFO); participation and empowerment (EMPOWER); self-managed teams (AUTOTEAM); training and 
skill development (PCOFFJOB, ONGOING); cross-utilisation and cross-training (TROTHJ2); symbolic 
egalitarianism (SAMETERM); promotion from within (INTERPRO). In addition the score includes an indicator 
that the workplace has a formal strategic plan (STRATEGY), strategic planning being a key component on 
HRM according to some commentators (Storey, 1992), and widespread appraisal systems (APPRAISE).  The 
variable is approximately normally distributed. 
20 The Investors in People (IiP) award is given to workplaces or organisations by independent assessors from 
Training and Enterprise Councils in England and Wales (Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland) which have a 
planned approach to setting and communicating business objectives and developing people to meet those 
objectives. 
21 The ‘voice’ measure (VOICE3) identifies a union voice as being present where there is a recognised union or 
the union appoints an employee representative to a joint consultative committee which meets regularly.  Non-
union voice comprises direct voice (incorporating team briefings, regular meetings between senior management 
and the workforce, and problem-solving groups) and non-union representative voice in the form of a joint 
consultative committee without union nominees which meets regularly. 
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3.4  Control variables for analyses of employee perceptions of the employee relations 
climate 
 
The combination of employee data on demographics, qualifications, job characteristics, and 
attitudes to their job, management and unions, coupled with workplace data obtained from 
the manager responsible for personnel or human resource issues at the site, allows us to 
control for a very wide range of individual-level and workplace-level information to estimate 
precisely influences on managerial responsiveness to employees.  Appendix Table 2 defines 
these variables and shows their incidence in the sample.  Here we discuss the rationale for the 
inclusion of variables that do not appear in our analyses of employer perceptions. 
Demographic characteristics of respondents:  our analyses incorporate gender, age 
and ethnicity, all of which have been associated with employee perceptions of management in 
previous studies (Bryson and McKay, 1997; Gallie, White, Cheng and Tomlinson, 1998).  
More highly educated workers often have higher expectations of involvement, and may 
therefore be particularly critical of management where participation is denied.  So I include 
individuals’ highest educational qualification, and whether they possess a vocational 
qualification. 
Job-related characteristics:  I control for five aspects of individuals’ jobs:  occupation 
(based on the 1990 Standard Occupational Classification); years spent working at the 
workplace; hours usually worked each week; whether the contract is a permanent one; and 
gross weekly wage.  Together these variables help capture an individual’s attachment to their 
workplace, the investment they have made in working there, and their status in the 
organisation.  
The twelve-category ordered variable capturing gross wages controls for a well-
known union effect which may confound other union effects, namely the union mark-up on 
wages.  Union-induced wage increases may make workers more positive about their working 
environment than they otherwise would be, so confounding estimates of a union-induced 
effect arising through bargaining arrangements. 
Union membership status:  it is a standard finding in the British and American 
literatures that unionised workers express greater dissatisfaction with management than non-
unionised workers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Gallie, White, Cheng and Tomlinson, 1998; 
Bryson, 1999; Bryson 2000).  Freeman and Medoff offer an explanation for this in the greater 
politicisation of unionised workers.  They suggest that unionised workers are more prone to 
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express their voice ‘loudly’ to ensure that it is heard, resulting in ‘voice-induced 
complaining’ (1984:  142) which they distinguish from ‘true’ dissatisfaction.  They also 
suggest that ‘some of the critical attitude of union workers is due to their greater awareness of 
problems and willingness to speak out’ (1984:  142).  As Gallie, White, Cheng and 
Tomlinson (1998:  113-114) point out:  ‘unionism as an oppositional form of representation 
may highlight organisational inefficiencies and colour perceptions of management 
competence’.  In addition, as Freeman and Medoff note (1984:  141), other things being 
equal, the stock of dissatisfied workers will be greater in unionised workplaces because 
dissatisfied workers are less likely to quit in unionised workplaces than they are in non-
unionised workplaces (Bryson and McKay, 1997).  I therefore control for individual union 
membership status to help distinguish between ‘membership’ and ‘workplace’ union effects. 
Workforce composition:  Two workforce composition variables are introduced 
alongside those used in the analysis of managerial perceptions.  I include the percentage of 
managers who are women to identify whether there is anything distinctive about the style of 
women managers which employees respond to.22  Secondly, I include a count variable 
identifying the total number of occupations at the workplace to differentiate simpler and more 
complex work processes.  The variable seeks to control for the possibility that effects 
associated with fragmented bargaining are simply picking up the effects of a more 
fragmented workforce. 
 
 
4.  Analysis 
 
4.1  The samples 
 
The analysis of managerial perceptions of climate is based on all the respondents to the 
managerial questionnaire in WERS98 with non-missing data.  The respondent is the person 
with day-to-day responsibility for personnel and employment relations matters at the 
workplace.  With weighting to account for complex survey design, survey results can be 
generalised with confidence to the population of workplaces in Britain employing 10 or more 
employees. 
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The analysis of employees’ perceptions of climate is based on all respondents to the 
employee questionnaire with non-missing data.  Others have confined their analyses of 
employees’ perceptions of climate to non-managerial employees, perhaps because managers 
are overwhelmingly positive in their assessment of climate and lie on one side of the 
management-employee line, while non-managerial employees lie on the other (Cully et al., 
1999:  276-283).  I adopt an alternative approach, analysing the perceptions of all employees 
with non-missing data.  After all, most managers experience ‘being managed’ or supervised.  
Those managers actually responsible for employee relations at sampled workplaces were 
eligible for the main management questionnaire, and were not included in the eligible sample 
of employees at the workplace.  Our models include occupational controls to account for 
more positive perceptions of climate further up the occupational hierarchy.With weighting to 
account for complex survey design, the employee survey results can be generalised with 
confidence to the population of employees in Britain employed at workplaces with 10 or 
more employees. 
 
4.2  Modelling procedures 
 
The climate variables are categorical indicators defined in terms of ordered responses.  I use  
ordered probit estimators to model the relationship between these dependent variables and 
sets of independent variables.  In ordered probit, an underlying unobservable score is 
estimated as a linear function of the independent variables and a set of unknown ‘threshold’ 
parameters, or cut points.  The probability of observing outcome i corresponds to the 
probability that the estimated linear function plus random error is within the range of the cut 
points estimated for the outcome.  It is assumed that the error term is normally distributed 
(Greene, 1997).  Significant positive coefficients indicate variables associated with better 
climate.  
Analyses take account of the complex survey design allowing results to be generalised 
to the workplace and employee populations from which the samples were drawn.  First, all 
models are run on data weighted by the inverse of the employer’s sampling probability in the 
case of the analysis of management data, and the employee’s sampling probability in the case 
of the employee data.  As well as allowing the results to be generalised to the population from 
                                                 
22 Whether managerial style is gendered has been the subject of much speculation and analysis recently 
(Wajcman, 1996, 2000). 
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which the sample is drawn, the use of probability weights also guards against estimation bias 
which can arise through differential sample selection probabilities.23  Secondly, we employ 
the Huber-White robust variance estimator that produces consistent standard errors in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity.24 Thirdly, we obtain accurate standard errors by taking 
account of sample stratification and the non-independence of employee observations due to 
clustering in the primary sampling units, namely workplaces. 
This procedure uses pseudo-likelihood methods, the point estimates being those from 
a weighted ‘likelihood’ which is not the distribution function for the sample.  Thus, standard 
likelihood-ratio tests are not valid (Skinner, 1989; STATA Manual, Release 6, Volume 4, 
1999). 
 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1  Employer perceptions of climate 
 
Appendix Tables 3 and 4 contain estimates of union effects on employer perceptions of the 
employee relations climate.  The dependent variable is the one presented in the last column of 
Table 1, but due to the small number of respondents saying climate was ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ 
I have collapsed these two categories so that the outcome variable runs from 1 ‘poor/very 
poor’ to 4 ‘very good’.  Positive coefficients indicate factors associated with better climate. 
Effects of categorical variables such as the type of bargaining arrangement are 
evaluated against a ‘reference’ category.  These categories are identified in the tables, and 
significance tests in the tables are based on comparisons of coefficients with the reference 
category.  However, there may be statistically significant effects across categories.  I test for 
these and report on all significant effects.25   
Appendix Table 3 presents seven models, each containing the full set of control 
variables, plus alternative measures of union strength.  Managers in unionised workplaces 
                                                 
23 Differential sampling fractions can result in standard estimator biases (Skinner, 1997).  The weights account 
for all variation in sampling probabilities, thus eliminating differential sampling probability as a possible source 
of estimation bias. 
24 The F statistic reported for each model is a Wald test based on the robustly estimated variance matrix.  
25 I do so by rebasing the equations, that is, altering reference categories, and, in other cases, by computing 
whether effects are significant using STATA’s SVYLC command (STATA Manual Release 6, Volume 4, 
pp.36-50). 
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had poorer perceptions of climate than managers in non-unionised workplaces, ceteris 
paribus, but the effect is only significant at a 90 per cent confidence level (Model (1)).  
However, the presence of an on-site union representative offsets this underlying negative 
effect (Model (2)).  Only in the absence of an on-site representative were perceptions poorer 
in unionised workplaces than in non-unionised workplaces (-0.34, t=1.94).  It may be that a 
union with an on-site representative can operate more effectively as an agent for the 
employer, or as a voice for workers, improving employer perceptions of climate as a result.   
The union density and bargaining coverage measures give somewhat conflicting 
indications as to the effect of union strength.  The union density measure provides no support 
for our proposition that managers may perceive climate as poorer where unions are strong or 
weak.  On the contrary, their perceptions of climate were poorest where union density was 
mid-range, that is, between 25 and 74 per cent (Model (3)).  However, high bargaining 
coverage was associated with poorer managerial perceptions of climate, although 100 per 
cent coverage was not (Model (4)).  Other analyses of WERS98 show that the union wage 
premium was confined to workplaces with high bargaining coverage, and was absent where 
there was 100 per cent coverage (Forth and Millward, 2000).  Taken together, these findings 
are consistent with the proposition that managers perceive the climate to be poorest where 
unions engage in effective wage bargaining. 
There is no support for the proposition that managers perceive climate as poorer 
where worker voice is fragmented.  Multi-unionism was not associated with poorer climate 
(Model (5)), and managerial perceptions of climate did not benefit from a unified worker 
voice in the form of a single union or single-table bargaining (Model (6)).  Finally, although 
dual channel arrangements, whereby union voice existed alongside non-union voice, were 
associated with poorer perceptions of climate relative to workplaces with no worker voice, 
the effect was barely statistically significant (Model (7)). 
In general, union strength and the degree to which worker voice is unified appear to 
be less important in explaining employer perceptions of climate than workforce composition, 
workplace characteristics such as size26 and industry, and management practices.  However, 
there is some evidence that managers viewed climate more poorly where unions were 
                                                 
26 In contrast to much of the literature, managers of smaller workplaces had poorer perceptions of climate.  
However, managers in owner-managed workplaces, which are often small, had better perceptions of climate 
than managers in other workplaces, ceteris paribus. 
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recognised for pay bargaining, particularly where bargaining coverage was high and where 
on-site representation was absent. 
Appendix Table 4 presents models containing three alternative measures of 
management attitudes towards unions.  The models contain the same set of controls as those 
in Appendix Table 3.  Model (1) shows that the negative perceptions of climate in the 
presence of recognised unions is confined to instances in which the union receives no 
practical support from management in encouraging union membership in the form of 
membership endorsement or enforcing a closed shop.  This supports the contention that 
employee relations will be poor where there is a union present that is not actively supported 
by management.  The proposition receives further support in Model (2):  controlling for 
union recognition, where management was ‘in favour’ of union membership, managerial 
perceptions of climate were more favourable than where they were ‘not in favour’.  However, 
the effect is only significant at a 90 per cent confidence level.  Although there is an indication 
that perceptions of climate were better where managers ‘strongly disagreed’ that they would 
rather consult directly with employees than with unions, the effect was not statistically 
significant (Model (3)). 
In summary, unionisation has an underlying negative impact on employer perceptions 
of climate.  However, this effect is absent where employers support union membership, and 
where employers benefit from the presence of a union representative on-site who may operate 
either as an effective communication channel with management in delivering workers’ 
‘voice’, or as an agent for the employer, or both.   
 
5.2  Employee perceptions of climate 
 
Appendix Tables 5 and 6 contain estimates of union effects on employee perceptions of the 
employee relations climate.  The dependent variable is the one presented in the first column 
of Table 1.  The outcome variable runs from 1 ‘very poor’ to 5 ‘very good’.  Again, positive 
coefficients indicate factors associated with better climate. 
As in the case of managerial perceptions, union recognition was associated with 
poorer perceptions of climate, ceteris paribus, though the effect is only significant at a 90 per 
cent confidence level (Appendix Table 5, Model (1)).27  However, in stark contrast to the 
                                                 
27 It is conceivable that individual union membership status and workplace tenure are both endogenous with 
respect to employee perceptions of climate since those who are least satisfied with the climate may be inclined 
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findings for managers, employee perceptions were significantly poorer in the presence of an 
on-site worker representative (Model (2)).  It may be that ‘voice-induced complaining’ and 
awareness of managerial shortcomings, discussed in Section Three, are both heightened in the 
presence of on-site representatives through their roles as purveyors of information and 
galvanisers of support for union causes. 
Contrary to expectations, employee perceptions of climate were not poorest where 
unions were weak.  Rather, they were poorest where unions were strong.  Thus, employee 
perceptions of climate deteriorated as union density rose (Model (2)).  Where union density 
was low, employee perceptions of climate were no different from those held by employees in 
workplaces with no union members.  Climate was particularly poor where union density 
exceeded 75 per cent.  Similarly, employee perceptions of climate were poorest where 
bargaining coverage was high (Model (3)).  As in the case of employers’ perceptions, 
perceptions of climate were no different in workplaces with 100 per cent coverage than they 
were in workplaces with no bargaining coverage, ceteris paribus. 
Earlier I suggested that employer perceptions of climate might be negatively affected 
by fragmented worker voice, whereas employees may benefit from fragmentation because 
fragmentation, whether in the form of multiple unions or union and non-union voice, may be 
better able to meet the needs of heterogeneous workers.  In fact, this was not so.  It was 
employees who perceived climate to be poorer where worker voice was fragmented.  
Employee perceptions of climate were poorest where there were multiple unions (Model (5)), 
where each union bargained separately (Model (6)), and where there was dual channel 
communication (Model (7)).  Interestingly, Model (6) shows that single-table bargaining can 
ameliorate the negative effects of multiple unionism.  This suggests that poorer employee 
perceptions of climate in the presence of multiple unionism was associated with the 
bargaining process, rather than other factors associated with multiple unionism such as 
demarcation disputes.  The negative effects of employers trying to reach agreement with 
                                                 
to respond by joining a union to ‘voice’ their concerns, or leaving (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  I therefore ran 
all the models presented  here excluding individual union membership status and workplace tenure.  Since union 
members are predominantly concentrated in workplaces with unions recognised for pay bargaining, and since 
unions are known to increase average workplace tenure by reducing the propensity to quit, one would expect the 
negative effects of membership and longer tenure to transfer to our unionisation measures once they are 
excluded from the models.  This is precisely what happens, so that the union effects are much stronger in the 
absence of these two variables.  For example, in Model (1), the union recognition dummy has a coefficient of –
0.15 and a t-statistic of 3.88 once membership status and workplace tenure are removed.  My rationale for their 
retention in the models is to estimate union effects net of these membership and tenure effects. 
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unions with competing interests outweighed any beneficial effects arising from multiple 
unions’ ability to represent sections of a workforce more effectively.   
In principle, non-union voice may complement union voice, either by helping union 
non-members to articulate their voice, or by addressing issues for all workers that the union 
does not address.  In practice, dual channel voice was associated with poorer perceptions of 
climate, suggesting that union and non-union voice may be substitutes for one another, rather 
than complements. 
Appendix Table 6 assesses the impact of managerial support for unions and employee 
perceptions of union effectiveness on employees’ perceptions of climate.  As in the case of 
employers, employees’ negative perceptions of climate in the presence of recognised unions 
were confined to instances in which the union received no practical support from 
management in encouraging union membership in the form of membership endorsement or 
enforcing a closed shop (Model (1)).  It appears from Model (2) that management attitudes to 
union membership were instrumental in determining how employees viewed the employee 
relations climate.  As anticipated, using employee perceptions of management attitudes to 
union membership, it appears that employee perceptions were best where management 
supported membership, and poorest where they were not in favour of membership.28  
However, a different picture emerges when we match in what employers said their attitudes 
were to union membership (Model (3)).  Employee perceptions of climate did not differ 
significantly according to what employers said their attitudes to union membership were, 
except in the small number of cases where managers had said that union membership was 
‘not an issue’.29  Taken together, these findings suggest that it is employees’ perception of 
management attitudes to unions, rather than the actual, professed views of management, 
which are important in explaining employees’ perceptions of climate.  However, there is 
evidence that employees respond particularly positively to employers who would rather 
consult with employees directly rather than with unions (Model (4)). 
Employee perceptions of union effectiveness were important in explaining employee 
perceptions of climate.  As anticipated, perceptions of climate were better where employees 
thought the union was taken seriously by management, and they were particularly poor where 
                                                 
28 This finding was confirmed in separate models for union members and non-members. 
29 In separate models for union members and non-members, I found employers’ professed attitudes towards 
union membership had no significant effect on members’ perceptions of climate.  However, non-members were 
sensitive to the way in which management engaged with unions, favouring the scenario in which management 
were not in favour of membership, or viewed it as ‘not an issue’. 
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employees thought that management did not taken the union seriously (Model (5)).  Running 
separate models for union members and non-members, these effects were just as strong for 
non-members as they were for members.  This suggests that the finding is not simply 
measuring the extent to which the union can deliver for its members.  It may also be an 
indicator of the extent to which employers engage seriously with the concerns and interests of 
all employees.  A similar conclusion can be drawn from Model (6) which shows that unions 
perceived as effectively dealing with members’ concerns can contribute to a better employee 
relations climate.  Again, this finding held for members and non-members. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Using matched employer-employee data from the WERS98, we have shown that employees 
tend to have a poorer perception of the employee relations climate at their workplace than 
their employers.  These differences can be explained, at least in part, by union effects since 
what delivers better climate from an employer perspective does not always do so from an 
employee perspective, and vice versa.   
I hypothesised that employer perceptions of climate would be poor in the presence of 
strong or weak unionism, but that they might be better where unions were strong enough to 
operate effectively, without having excessive bargaining power.  There was some support for 
this hypothesis, since the poorer perceptions of climate associated with unionisation were 
confined to workplaces without on-site worker representation, where worker voice is 
necessarily weak.  Equally, employer perceptions of climate were particularly poor where a 
high percentage of workers were covered by collective bargaining.  I interpret this effect as a 
bargaining effect associated with circumstances in which unions are able to achieve a wage 
premium.  
I also hypothesised that employee perceptions of climate would be poor in the 
presence of weak unions, and better where unions were sufficiently strong to represent 
workers’; interests.  In fact, employee perceptions of climate were poorest where there were 
strong unions present, as indicated by the presence of an on-site representative, high union 
density or high bargaining coverage.  I suggested that these effects might be explained, in 
part, by the politicising effect of strong unionism, and also by the antagonism that can arise 
where unions use their bargaining strength to push wage claims. 
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Contrary to expectations, fragmented bargaining arrangements were not associated 
with poorer employer perceptions of climate.  Instead, they were associated with poorer 
employee perceptions of climate.  This suggests that employer moves to simplify bargaining 
arrangements in the 1990s, discussed in Section Two, may have been in response to 
employee concerns about fragmentation, rather than a direct response to employers’ own 
perceptions of employee relations. 
There is support from both employers and employees for the contention that employee 
relations will be poor where there is a union present that is not actively supported by 
management.  But from an employee perspective, it is employees’ perception of management 
attitudes to unions, rather than the actual, professed views of management, which are 
important in explaining employees’ perceptions of climate. 
Finally, the analysis confirms that the direction of union effects on employee 
perceptions of climate depends on how they perceive union effectiveness in dealing with 
employers and with employees concerns.  Where they are perceived as effective, they 
contribute to better perceptions of climate, whilst ineffective unions are associated with 
poorer climate.  This was true for union members and non-members alike. 
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Appendix Table 1:  Control Variables Used in Analysis of Managerial Perceptions of the Employee 
Relations Climate 
Collective bargaining:  
CBA, collective bargaining arrangements: 
No recognised union 
Single union 
Multi-union, joint bargaining 
Multi-union, separate bargaining by each union 
Multi-union, separate bargaining by groups of unions 
Multi-union, bargaining arrangement data missing 
 
64 
23 
8 
5 
* 
1 
NCOV2PC7, % of workforce covered by collective bargaining: 
None 
1-19% 
20-39% 
40-59% 
60-79% 
80-99% 
100% 
 
64 
3 
2 
5 
4 
5 
17 
NCOV2PC, % workforce covered by collective bargaining, continuous 27 
NRECOG3, number of recognised unions 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 or more 
 
63 
23 
8 
3 
2 
Other union-related variables:  
UREP2, if on-site union representative 20 
CLSHOP, union membership arrangements: 
No union members 
Closed shop  
Management strongly recommends union membership 
Union members present but no closed shop or management endorsement 
 
53 
1 
9 
37 
NDENS6, union density 
No union members 
1-24% 
25-49% 
50-74% 
75-99% 
100% 
Some members, don’t know how many 
 
53 
12 
10 
11 
9 
4 
1 
NDENSITY, union density, continuous 24 
EVIEWS, how would you describe management’s general attitude towards trade union membership 
among employees at this establishment? 
In favour 
Not in favour 
Neutral 
Not an issue 
Other answer 
 
 
   28 
16 
54 
2 
* 
APHRAS07, we would rather consult directly with employees than with unions: 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
32 
43 
15 
9 
1 
VOICE3, nature of worker voice: 
Union only 
Dual channel 
Non-union only 
No voice 
 
5 
30 
48 
17 
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Respondent’s characteristics:  
RESPFEM, if respondent a woman 37 
SPECIAL, if respondent is employee relations specialist according to job title 19 
JTEN6PS, if respondent in current job for six or more years 37 
Workforce composition:  
PCFEM, % of workforce who are women 54 
PCPTCAT, % of workforce who are part-timers: 
None 
Under 10% 
10%, under 25% 
25%, under 50% 
50%, under 75% 
75% or more 
 
18 
19 
15 
17 
20 
12 
PCETHNI5, % of workforce from non-white ethnic minorities: 
None 
Under 5% 
5-10% 
11-19% 
20% or more 
 
62 
16 
11 
5 
6 
NEMPSIZE, number of employees at workplace: 
10-24 
25-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500 or more  
 
50 
26 
13 
6 
4 
1 
Workplace ownership:  
PUBLIC, if public sector 25 
DAYTODAY, if single individual/family with controlling interest is involved in day-to-day 
management of workplace on full-time basis  
 
17 
SINGLE, if single independent workplace (as opposed to part of a multi-site organisation)  
30 
UKFOR, UK or foreign-owned: 
UK owned 
Foreign owned 
50/50 
 
93 
6 
1 
Workplace activity, age and location:  
ASIC, standard industrial classification (single digit): 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail distribution 
Hotels and restaurants  
Transport and communication 
Financial services 
Other business services 
Public administration 
Education 
Health 
Other community services 
 
13 
* 
4 
19 
8 
5 
3 
11 
5 
13 
14 
5 
KACTIVI, activity at the workplace: 
Produce goods or services for customers 
Supplier of goods or services to other companies 
Supplier of goods or services to other parts of organisation to which we belong 
Do not produce goods or services for sale in open market 
Administrative office only 
 
53 
24 
3 
   15 
5 
AGECAT2, age of establishment at current address: 
Under 3 years 
3-20 years 
 
11 
50 
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Over 20 years 40 
GREENFLD, if workplace set up on greenfield site in last 10 years 5 
SSR, Standard statistical region: 
East Anglia 
East Midlands 
London 
North 
North West 
Scotland 
Rest of South East 
South West 
Wales 
West Midlands 
Yorkshire and Humberside 
 
4 
7 
12 
5 
13 
8 
21 
9 
4 
10 
8 
Management practices:  
HRMSCORE, count of 13 human resource management practices 6.8 
NINFO, number of items of information regularly given to employees regarding internal investment 
plans, the financial position of the workplace, and staffing plans: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
19 
19 
28 
34 
AUTOTEAM, degree of autonomy for team-working, scoring points for if any team-working, then 
extra points if team appoints own team-leaders, decides how work is done, has responsibility for 
specific products/services: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
 
 
24 
5 
28 
37 
5 
TROTHJ2, if some of employees from largest non-managerial occupational group are formally 
trained to jobs other than their own 
 
69 
PCOFFJOB, percentage of experienced workers in largest non-managerial occupational group 
having formal off-the-job training in the previous twelve months: 
None 
1-19% 
20-39% 
40-59% 
60-79% 
80-99% 
100% 
 
 
24 
20 
13 
9 
8 
8 
18 
ONGOING, if on-going training is one of the main methods by which employees in the largest non-
managerial occupational group are made aware of their job responsibilities 
 
71 
SELECTIV, if skills, qualifications, experience and motivation all important in recruitment 54 
JOBSECUR, if policy of guaranteed job security, no compulsory redundancies 11 
EMPOWER, count based on whether largest non-managerial occupational group at the workplace 
has a lot of variety in their work, discretion over how they do their work, and control over the pace 
at which they do their work: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
 
38 
34 
17 
11 
APPRAISE, if 80% or more of non-managerial staff are formally appraised 53 
INTERPRO, if preference given to internal applicants, other things being equal, when filling 
vacancies 
25 
SAMETERM, if management has same non-pay terms and conditions as employees in the largest 
non-managerial occupational group 
 
43 
PROFITPY, if workplace has a profit-related pay scheme 33 
PERFPAY, if workplace has performance-related pay scheme 18 
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CASHBO, if workplace has cash bonuses  22 
ESOP, if workplace has an employee share option scheme 15 
JCC, if workplace has a joint consultative committee dealing with a range of issues 20 
NONUCHAN, counts up to three direct non-union communication channels, based on:  regular 
meetings with entire workforce; team briefings involving identifiable work groups meeting at least 
once a month where at least some of the time is devoted to questions from employees or employees 
offering their views; problem-solving groups such as quality circles  
 
 
 
1.2 
REGMEET, if regular meetings with entire workforce present 42 
TBRIEF3, if team briefings involving identifiable work groups meeting at least once a month where 
at least some of the time is devoted to questions from employees or employees offering their views 
 
 
42 
MANCHAIN, if systematic use of management chain or systematic cascading of information 54 
SUGGEST1, if suggestion scheme 24 
NEWSLET, if regular newsletter distributed to all employees 42 
OTHCONS, if other ways in which management communicates or consults with employees 15 
PCQCIRC, proportion of non-managerial employees involved in problem-solving groups/quality 
circles in last 12 months: 
None 
1-19% 
20-39% 
40-79% 
80% or more 
 
 
70 
5 
7 
7 
12 
TARCON, if targets set in consultation with employees: 
Yes 
Targets set but no consultation 
No targets set 
 
45 
41 
15 
STRATEGY, if workplace is covered by a formal strategic plan 74 
AWARD, if workplace or organisation to which it belongs has been accredited as an Investor in 
People 
34 
GRIEVPRO, if formal procedure for dealing with individual grievances 88 
FORMPROC, if formal procedure for dealing with collective disputes 50 
WRITPOL, if workplace has a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity 67 
 
Base:  all workplaces with 10 or more employees with non-missing data.  Data weighted by probability of 
selection.  Note:  all column percentages, except HRMSCORE, NONUCHAN, which are mean scores. 
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Appendix Table 2:  Control Variables Used in Analysis of Employee Perceptions of Climate 
 All 
Individual-level data:  
Demographic:  
FEM, if female 49 
ETHNIC, if non-white ethnic minority 4 
AGE, age, in years: 
Under 20 
20-24 
25-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60+  
 
5 
8 
12 
28 
25 
18 
4 
HEDQUAL, Highest educational qualification: 
No qualifications 
CSE or equivalent 
GCSE or equivalent 
A level of equivalent 
Degree or equivalent 
Post-graduate 
 
26 
12 
26 
15 
16 
5 
VOCQUAL, if any vocational qualifications 37 
MEMBTU, union membership status: 
Current member 
Ex-member 
Never member 
 
39 
18 
42 
  
Job-related characteristics:  
OCCGRP2, occupation: 
Managers and senior administrators 
Professional 
Associate professional and technical 
Clerical and secretarial 
Craft and skilled service 
Personal and protective service 
Sales 
Operative and assembly 
Other occupations 
 
9 
11 
8 
18 
10 
12 
9 
13 
10 
TENURE, workplace tenure, in years: 
Less than one 
One, less than two 
Two, less than five 
Five, less than ten 
Ten or more 
 
17 
13 
23 
22 
26 
HOURS, usual weekly hours: 
Less than ten 
Ten, less than twenty-nine 
Thirty or more 
 
5 
21 
74 
PERM, if permanent contract 92 
GROSSWAGE, gross weekly wage: 
Less than £50 
£51-80 
£81-140 
£141-180 
£181-220 
£221-260 
£261-310 
£311-360 
£361-430 
 
7 
7 
13 
9 
11 
10 
10 
8 
10 
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£431-540 
£541-680 
£681 or more 
7 
4 
3 
  
Workplace-level data:  
Collective bargaining:  
CBA, collective bargaining arrangements: 
No recognised union 
Single union 
Multi-union, joint bargaining 
Multi-union, separate bargaining by each union 
Multi-union, separate bargaining by groups of unions 
Multi-union, bargaining arrangement data missing 
 
42 
22 
20 
11 
3 
2 
NCOV2PC7, % of workforce covered by collective bargaining: 
None 
1-19% 
20-39% 
40-59% 
60-79% 
80-99% 
100% 
 
44 
3 
5 
4 
6 
13 
25 
NCOV2PC, % workforce covered by collective bargaining, continuous 44 
NRECOG3, number of recognised unions 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 or more 
 
42 
22 
14 
8 
14 
Other union-related variables based on management data:  
UREP2, if on-site union representative 48 
CLSHOP, union membership arrangements: 
No union members 
Closed shop  
Management strongly recommends union membership 
Union members present but no closed shop/management endorsement 
 
31 
1 
9 
59 
NDENS6, union density: 
No union members 
1-24% 
25-49% 
50-74% 
75-99% 
100% 
Some members, don’t know how many 
 
32 
15 
17 
15 
18 
2 
3 
NDENSITY, union density, continuous 35 
EVIEWS, how would you describe management’s general attitude towards trade union membership 
among employees at this establishment?  (Management respondent data) 
In favour 
Not in favour 
Neutral 
Not an issue 
Other answer 
 
 
 
38 
11 
49 
2 
* 
APHRAS07, we would rather consult directly with employees than with unions: 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
25 
32 
20 
20 
3 
VOICE3, nature of worker voice:  
 36
Union only 
Dual channel 
Non-union only 
No voice 
5 
54 
34 
7 
Union-related variables based on employee data:  
C4_, how would you describe management’s general attitude towards trade union membership 
among employees at this establishment? 
In favour 
Neutral 
Not in favour 
Other answer 
 
 
18 
54 
28 
* 
PROBLEMS, unions/staff associations at this workplace take notice of members’ problems and 
complaints: 
Employee says not applicable and employer says no union present 
Employee DK/NA, employer says union members present 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Multiple response where no members present according to employer 
 
 
29 
27 
5 
24 
11 
3 
1 
* 
SERIOUS, unions/staff associations at this workplace are taken seriously by management: 
Employee says not applicable and employer says no union present 
Employee DK/NA, employer says union members present 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Multiple response where no members present according to employer 
 
29 
27 
3 
19 
14 
6 
2 
* 
  
Workforce composition:  
PCFEM, % of workforce who are women 49 
PCPTCAT, % of workforce who are part-timers: 
None 
Under 10% 
10%, under 25% 
25%, under 50% 
50%, under 75% 
75% or more 
 
10 
35 
14 
17 
16 
7 
PCETHNI5, % of workforce from non-white ethnic minorities: 
None 
Under 5% 
5-10% 
11-19% 
20% or more 
 
37 
41 
10 
6 
5 
PCMANFE2, % of managers who are women: 
None 
Under 50% 
50-99% 
All 
No managers at workplace 
 
22 
46 
19 
7 
5 
NOCCS, number of occupations at the workplace 5.3 
NEMPSIZE, number of employees at workplace: 
10-24 
25-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
 
13 
14 
15 
15 
20 
 37
500 or more  24 
Workplace ownership:  
PUBLIC, if public sector 31 
SINGLE, if single independent workplace (as opposed to part of a multi-site organisation) 22 
UKFOR, UK or foreign-owned: 
UK owned 
Foreign owned 
50/50 
 
86 
13 
1 
Workplace activity, age and location:  
ASIC, standard industrial classification (single digit): 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail distribution 
Hotels and restaurants  
Transport and communication 
Financial services 
Other business services 
Public administration 
Education 
Health 
Other community services 
 
23 
1 
3 
15 
4 
6 
4 
8 
9 
10 
13 
3 
KACTIVI, activity at the workplace: 
Produce goods or services for customers 
Supplier of goods or services to other companies 
Supplier of goods/services to other parts of organisation 
Do not produce goods or services for sale in open market 
Administrative office only 
 
53 
22 
7 
14 
4 
AGECAT2, age of establishment at current address: 
Under 3 years 
3-20 years 
Over 20 years 
 
8 
41 
51 
SSR, Standard statistical region: 
East Anglia 
East Midlands 
London 
North 
North West 
Scotland 
Rest of South East 
South West 
Wales 
West Midlands 
Yorkshire and Humberside 
 
5 
9 
10 
7 
10 
10 
19 
8 
4 
10 
8 
Management practices:  
SPECIAL, if main managerial respondent is an employee relations specialist 49 
HRMSCORE, count of 13 human resource management practices 7.5 
NINFO, number of items of information regularly given to employees regarding internal investment 
plans, the financial position of the workplace, and staffing plans: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
13 
17 
28 
42 
AUTOTEAM, degree of autonomy for team-working, scoring points for if any team-working, then 
extra points if team appoints own team-leaders, decides how work is done, has responsibility for 
specific products/services: 
0 
1 
2 
 
 
 
13 
7 
36 
 38
3 
4 
38 
6 
TROTHJ2, if some of employees from largest non-managerial occupational group are formally 
trained to jobs other than their own 
 
78 
PCOFFJOB, percentage of experienced workers in largest non-managerial occupational group 
having formal off-the-job training in the previous twelve months: 
None 
1-19% 
20-39% 
40-59% 
60-79% 
80-99% 
100% 
 
 
13 
19 
18 
12 
11 
12 
15 
ONGOING, if on-going training is one of the main methods by which employees in the largest non-
managerial occupational group are made aware of their job responsibilities 
 
69 
SELECTIV, if skills, qualifications, experience and motivation all important in recruitment 62 
JOBSECUR, if policy of guaranteed job security, no compulsory redundancies 15 
EMPOWER, count based on whether largest non-managerial occupational group at the workplace 
has a lot of variety in their work, discretion over how they do their work, and control over the pace 
at which they do their work: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
 
47 
32 
15 
7 
APPRAISE, if 80% or more of non-managerial staff are formally appraised 57 
INTERPRO, if preference given to internal applicants, other things being equal, when filling 
vacancies 
36 
SAMETERM, if management has same non-pay terms and conditions as employees in the largest 
non-managerial occupational group 
40 
PROFITPY, if workplace has a profit-related pay scheme 39 
PERFPAY, if workplace has performance-related pay scheme 27 
CASHBO, if workplace has cash bonuses 26 
ESOP, if workplace has an employee share option scheme 23 
JCC, if workplace has a joint consultative committee dealing with a range of issues 45 
NONUCHAN, counts up to three direct non-union communication channels, based on:  regular 
meetings with entire workforce; team briefings involving identifiable work groups meeting at least 
once a month where at least some of the time is devoted to questions from employees or employees 
offering their views; problem-solving groups such as quality circles  
1.4 
REGMEET, if regular meetings with entire workforce present 35 
TBRIEF3, if team briefings involving identifiable work groups meeting at least once a month where 
at least some of the time is devoted to questions from employees or employees offering their views 
54 
MANCHAIN, if systematic use of management chain or systematic cascading of information 70 
SUGGEST1, if suggestion scheme 28 
NEWSLET, if regular newsletter distributed to all employees 65 
OTHCONS, if other ways in which management communicates or consults with employees 20 
PCQCIRC, proportion of non-managerial employees involved in problem-solving groups/quality 
circles in last 12 months: 
None 
1-19% 
20-39% 
40-79% 
80% or more 
 
 
52 
11 
15 
12 
11 
TARCON, if targets set in consultation with employees: 
Yes 
Targets set but no consultation 
No targets set 
 
42 
49 
9 
STRATEGY, if workplace is covered by a formal strategic plan 85 
AWARD, if workplace or organisation to which it belongs has been accredited as an Investor in 
People 
35 
 39
GRIEVPRO, if formal procedure for dealing with individual grievances 96 
FORMPROC, if formal procedure for dealing with collective disputes 66 
WRITPOL, if workplace has a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity 81 
 
Base:  all employees with non-missing data in workplaces with 10 or more employees. Note all are column 
percentages, except HRMSCORE, NONUCHAN and NOCCS, all of which are the mean scores of count 
variables. 
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Appendix Table 3:  Employer Perceptions of Climate and Union Strength 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Union measures:        
Union recognition  -0.242       
 (1.77)       
On-site representation (ref.:  
recognised union with on-site 
representation) 
       
No recognition, no on-site rep  0.174      
  (1.19)      
Recognition, no on-site rep  -0.169      
  (0.93)      
Union and non-union voice (ref.:  
no voice) 
       
Union voice only        -0.261 
       (0.99) 
Union and non-union voice       -0.354 
       (1.61) 
Non-union voice only        -0.151 
       (0.85) 
Collective bargaining 
arrangements (ref.:  joint 
bargaining) 
       
Single union      -0.044  
      (0.25)  
Separate bargaining, each union       
0.052 
 
      (0.26)  
Separate bargaining, groups of 
unions 
      
0.230 
 
      (0.75)  
Multi-union, arrangement 
missing 
      
-0.085 
 
      (0.17)  
No recognition      0.215  
      (1.17)  
Number of recognised unions 
(ref.:  none) 
       
One     -0.254   
     (1.72)   
Two     -0.106   
     (0.61)   
Three or more     -0.335   
     (1.67)   
Bargaining coverage (ref.:  zero)        
100%    -0.239    
    (1.50)    
80-99%    -0.427    
    (2.32)*    
60-79%    -0.243    
    (1.21)    
40-59%    0.242    
    (0.86)    
20-39%    0.183    
    (0.84)    
1-19%    0.187    
    (0.61)    
Union density (ref.:  zero)        
1-24%   -0.162     
   (1.02)     
25-49%   -0.470     
   (2.51)*     
50-74%   -0.510     
   (2.36)*     
75-99%   0.043     
   (0.24)     
100%   -0.352     
   (1.24)     
Members, but don’t know %   -0.422     
   (1.58)     
Respondent characteristics:        
Female -0.102 -0.116 -0.115 -0.118 -0.107 -0.103 -0.096 
 (1.02) (1.15) (1.17) (1.14) (1.07) (1.03) (0.94) 
ER specialist -0.550 -0.547 -0.501 -0.487 -0.547 -0.554 -0.544 
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 (4.17)** (4.14)** (3.76)** (3.65)** (4.16)** (4.20)** (4.14)** 
Job tenure 6+ years 0.207 0.194 0.233 0.202 0.208 0.207 0.203 
 (1.81) (1.66) (2.07)* (1.76) (1.81) (1.81) (1.76) 
Workforce composition:        
% female 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (1.11) (1.22) (1.05) (0.98) (1.08) (1.13) (1.02) 
% part-time (ref.:  none)        
Under 10% -0.542 -0.528 -0.558 -0.603 -0.539 -0.541 -0.520 
 (3.68)** (3.59)** (3.79)** (3.96)** (3.67)** (3.68)** (3.53)** 
10, <25% -0.676 -0.686 -0.691 -0.700 -0.677 -0.676 -0.655 
 (3.41)** (3.46)** (3.59)** (3.37)** (3.42)** (3.42)** (3.29)** 
25, <50% -0.326 -0.320 -0.354 -0.399 -0.328 -0.326 -0.291 
 (1.69) (1.64) (1.85) (2.00)* (1.69) (1.68) (1.49) 
50, <75% -0.030 -0.051 0.016 -0.050 -0.021 -0.027 -0.051 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.07) (0.23) (0.10) (0.13) (0.24) 
75+% 0.432 0.431 0.438 0.435 0.438 0.430 0.451 
 (1.78) (1.76) (1.79) (1.77) (1.81) (1.77) (1.83) 
% non-white ethnic minority 
(ref.:  none) 
       
Under 5% -0.041 -0.056 -0.033 -0.063 -0.043 -0.043 -0.064 
 (0.35) (0.47) (0.28) (0.52) (0.37) (0.36) (0.54) 
5-10% -0.314 -0.341 -0.321 -0.271 -0.318 -0.318 -0.348 
 (1.86) (2.00)* (1.94) (1.56) (1.88) (1.88) (2.03)* 
11-20% -0.767 -0.828 -0.806 -0.754 -0.776 -0.767 -0.854 
 (3.09)** (3.32)** (3.15)** (2.84)** (3.13)** (3.08)** (3.42)** 
Over 20% -0.611 -0.690 -0.596 -0.503 -0.616 -0.610 -0.698 
 (2.42)* (2.73)** (2.41)* (1.95) (2.41)* (2.39)* (2.75)** 
Workplace characteristics:        
Workplace size (ref.:  200-499 
employees)  
       
10-24 employees -0.347 -0.311 -0.325 -0.346 -0.355 -0.327 -0.370 
 (2.14)* (1.92) (1.98)* (2.15)* (2.18)* (2.03)* (2.24)* 
25-49 employees -0.110 -0.105 -0.100 -0.068 -0.117 -0.089 -0.137 
 (0.74) (0.70) (0.67) (0.46) (0.78) (0.60) (0.90) 
50-99 employees -0.209 -0.185 -0.177 -0.149 -0.214 -0.191 -0.206 
 (1.63) (1.42) (1.39) (1.17) (1.65) (1.49) (1.58) 
100-199 employees -0.149 -0.144 -0.139 -0.138 -0.158 -0.135 -0.159 
 (1.22) (1.17) (1.14) (1.11) (1.29) (1.12) (1.28) 
500 or more employees 0.230 0.229 0.262 0.209 0.251 0.222 0.223 
 (1.92) (1.91) (2.13)* (1.72) (2.06)* (1.83) (1.85) 
Owner-managed 0.300 0.278 0.279 0.340 0.297 0.300 0.285 
 (1.81) (1.68) (1.66) (1.98)* (1.80) (1.81) (1.73) 
Public sector -0.044 -0.078 -0.006 -0.086 -0.065 -0.052 -0.072 
 (0.24) (0.43) (0.03) (0.43) (0.36) (0.28) (0.41) 
Country of ownership (ref.:  UK)        
Foreign-owned 0.056 0.053 0.025 0.162 0.057 0.055 0.060 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.13) (0.87) (0.30) (0.29) (0.32) 
50/50 ownership  1.671 1.632 1.600 1.667 1.668 1.667 1.731 
 (4.73)** (4.65)** (4.45)** (4.82)** (4.70)** (4.72)** (4.55)** 
Single independent workplace 0.063 0.063 0.077 0.080 0.067 0.062 0.062 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.56) (0.57) (0.48) (0.44) (0.45) 
Standard industrial classification 
(ref.:  wholesale/retail 
distribution) 
       
Manufacturing 0.149 0.137 0.166 0.078 0.145 0.148 0.126 
 (0.72) (0.66) (0.79) (0.36) (0.70) (0.71) 0.335 
Electricity, gas, water 0.954 0.925 0.821 0.963 1.016 0.928 0.917 
 (3.86)** (3.69)** (3.11)** (3.82)** (3.76)** (3.51)** (3.71)** 
Construction 0.338 0.331 0.319 0.242 0.334 0.340 0.282 
 (1.24) (1.20) (1.19) (0.87) (1.23) (1.25) (1.02) 
Hotels and restaurants 0.528 0.524 0.508 0.487 0.531 0.528 0.526 
 (2.36)* (2.34)* (2.28)* (2.16)* (2.38)* (2.37)* (2.34)* 
Transport and communication 0.237 0.211 0.249 0.178 0.208 0.223 0.210 
 (1.13) (1.00) (1.11) (0.82) (0.98) (1.05) (1.01) 
Financial services 0.226 0.202 0.161 0.218 0.208 0.224 0.195 
 (0.82) (0.73) (0.56) (0.75) (0.75) (0.81) (0.70) 
Other business services 0.384 0.367 0.400 0.354 0.389 0.383 0.385 
 (1.99)* (1.89) (2.07)* (1.85) (2.02)* (1.99)* (2.02)* 
Public administration 0.522 0.528 0.497 0.512 0.529 0.511 0.520 
 (1.97)* (2.00)* (1.92) (1.89) (2.02)* (1.95) (1.99)* 
Education 0.891 0.793 1.036 0.745 0.922 0.890 0.794 
 (3.63)** (3.20)** (4.30)** (2.87)** (3.78)** (3.62)** (3.24)** 
Health 0.327 0.337 0.375 0.287 0.332 0.319 (0.61) 
 (1.45) (1.50) (1.72) (1.26) (1.48) (1.43) (1.49) 
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Other community services 0.463 0.456 0.457 0.443 0.466 0.467 0.469 
 (1.82) (1.78) (1.80) (1.71) (1.83) (1.83) (1.82) 
Workplace activity (ref.:  
produces goods or services for 
customers)  
       
Supplier to other companies -0.008 -0.022 -0.007 -0.015 -0.006 -0.005 -0.021 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.15) 
Supplier to other parts of the 
organisation 
 
0.157 
 
0.167 
 
0.154 
 
0.161 
 
0.157 
 
0.158 
 
0.166 
 (0.70) (0.74) (0.67) (0.69) (0.69) (0.70) (0.73) 
Does not produce for open 
market  
 
-0.085 
 
-0.100 
 
-0.113 
 
-0.117 
 
-0.088 
 
-0.086 
 
-0.112 
 (0.60) (0.67) (0.78) (0.80) (0.62) (0.61) (0.77) 
Administrative office 0.235 0.237 0.228 0.294 0.236 0.234 0.236 
 (0.92) (0.97) (0.92) (1.13) (0.94) (0.93) (0.94) 
Age of workplace (ref.:  3-20 
years) 
       
Under 3 years -0.287 -0.281 -0.290 -0.270 -0.277 -0.290 -0.275 
 (1.63) (1.60) (1.67) (1.51) (1.57) (1.65) (1.56) 
Over 20 years -0.245 -0.271 -0.261 -0.242 -0.247 -0.247 -0.270 
 (2.38)* (2.56)* (2.53)* (2.29)* (2.39)* (2.40)* (2.58)** 
Built on greenfield site in last 10 
years 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.084 
 
0.097 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.024 
 (0.17) (0.07) (0.35) (0.43) (0.19) (0.16) (0.11) 
Standard statistical region (ref.:  
rest of South East 
       
East Anglia 0.211 0.207 0.242 0.309 0.207 0.211 0.181 
 (1.09) (1.06) 0.295 (1.62) (1.07) (1.09) 0.210 
East Midlands 0.426 0.439 0.474 0.364 0.417 0.425 0.432 
 (2.07)* (2.14)* (2.36)* (1.79) (2.03)* (2.07)* (2.13)* 
London 0.534 0.543 0.552 0.472 0.527 0.528 0.551 
 (2.84)** (2.89)** (2.95)** (2.52)* (2.81)** (2.80)** (2.96)** 
North 0.666 0.657 0.639 0.674 0.667 0.663 0.669 
 (3.68)** (3.58)** (3.52)** (3.66)** (3.67)** (3.63)** (3.65)** 
North West  0.510 0.494 0.516 0.427 0.496 0.506 0.482 
 (2.80)** (2.61)** (2.86)** (2.30)* (2.73)** (2.79)** (2.58)** 
Scotland 0.286 0.264 0.280 0.288 0.291 0.278 0.295 
 (1.54) (1.41) (1.54) (1.53) (1.58) (1.50) (1.58) 
South West  0.128 0.116 0.141 0.065 0.134 0.126 0.128 
 (0.59) (0.54) (0.64) (0.31) (0.62) (0.58) (0.59) 
Wales 0.729 0.720 0.676 0.592 0.730 0.731 0.732 
 (3.19)** (3.03)** (2.95)** (2.54)* (3.18)** (3.19)** (3.06)** 
West Midlands 0.571 0.592 0.579 0.524 0.565 0.574 0.602 
 (2.75)** (2.82)** (2.81)** (2.49)* (2.72)** (2.77)** (2.91)** 
Yorks and Humberside 0.285 0.224 (1.27) 0.214 0.283 0.283 (0.93) 
 (1.49) (1.16) (1.50) (1.09) (1.48) (1.48) (1.10) 
Management practices:        
HRM score 0.023 0.017 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.019 
 (0.92) (0.68) (0.79) (0.87) (0.92) (0.95) (0.76) 
Number of direct voice channels  
-0.040 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.057 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.042 
 
0.000 
 (0.71) (0.43) (0.83) (0.98) (0.82) (0.75) (0.01) 
IiP award 0.328 0.311 0.348 0.344 0.326 0.329 0.314 
 (3.20)** (3.02)** (3.47)** (3.31)** (3.17)** (3.20)** (3.04)** 
cut1:Constant -2.003 -1.884 -2.057 -2.105 -2.026 -1.772 -2.170 
 (6.13)** (5.55)** (6.21)** (6.36)** (6.20)** (4.87)** (6.28)** 
cut2:Constant -1.177 -1.054 -1.221 -1.257 -1.198 -0.945 -1.339 
 (3.72)** (3.21)** (3.75)** (3.98)** (3.80)** (2.66)** (4.00)** 
cut3:Constant 0.566 0.693 0.540 0.507 0.547 0.800 0.410 
 (1.71) (2.03)* (1.58) (1.54) (1.65) (2.17)* (1.17) 
Observations 1962 1962 1941 1890 1962 1962 1920 
F (55,1837)
=5.00 
(56,1790)
=4.59 
(60,1811)
=5.26 
(60,1760)
=4.84 
(57,1835)
=4.92 
(59,1833)
=4.71 
(57,1793)
=4.42 
 
Notes:  (1) absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (2) * is significant at 95 per cent ** is significant at 
99 per cent. 
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Appendix Table 4:  Employer Perceptions of Climate and Attitudes to Unions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Union measures:    
Managerial endorsement of union membership 
(ref.:  no union recognition) 
   
Recognition, no management recommendation 
of membership, no closed shop 
 
 
-0.283 
  
 (1.93)   
Recognition, management strongly recommends 
membership 
 
-0.096 
  
 (0.49)   
Recognition, closed shop 0.333   
 (0.65)   
Management attitudes to union membership 
(ref.:  not in favour of membership) 
   
In favour of membership   0.317  
  (1.77)  
Neutral  0.094  
  (0.67)  
Not an issue  0.511  
  (1.31)  
Other answers  0.338  
  (1.04)  
Recognised union  -0.333 -0.239 
  (2.29)* (1.68) 
Would rather consult directly with employees 
than with unions (ref.:  neither agree nor 
disagree) 
   
Strongly agree   -0.158 
   (1.02) 
Agree   -0.025 
   (0.19) 
Disagree   -0.205 
   (1.05) 
Strongly disagree   0.275 
   (1.06) 
Respondent characteristics:    
Female -0.100 -0.108 -0.094 
 (1.00) (1.06) (0.93) 
ER specialist -0.543 -0.561 -0.538 
 (4.11)** (4.27)** (4.02)** 
Job tenure 6+ years 0.199 0.201 0.211 
 (1.76) (1.76) (1.87) 
Workforce composition:    
% female 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (1.14) (1.13) (1.12) 
% part-time (ref.:  none)    
Under 10% -0.531 -0.527 -0.539 
 (3.65)** (3.59)** (3.65)** 
10, <25% -0.653 -0.650 -0.672 
 (3.30)** (3.26)** (3.49)** 
25, <50% -0.330 -0.309 -0.336 
 (1.73) (1.61) (1.78) 
50, <75% -0.016 -0.015 -0.028 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.13) 
75+% 0.451 0.430 0.418 
 (1.86) (1.78) (1.75) 
% non-white ethnic minority (ref.:  none)    
Under 5% -0.039 -0.016 -0.036 
 (0.33) (0.14) (0.31) 
5-10% -0.311 -0.253 -0.304 
 (1.85) (1.49) (1.81) 
11-20% -0.753 -0.736 -0.772 
 (3.05)** (3.00)** (3.12)** 
Over 20% -0.602 -0.571 -0.613 
 (2.41)* (2.31)* (2.55)* 
Workplace characteristics:    
Workplace size (ref.:  200-499 employees)     
10-24 employees -0.346 -0.343 -0.350 
 (2.13)* (2.12)* (2.18)* 
25-49 employees -0.105 -0.115 -0.103 
 (0.70) (0.77) (0.71) 
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50-99 employees -0.204 -0.208 -0.213 
 (1.59) (1.62) (1.66) 
100-199 employees -0.152 -0.147 -0.157 
 (1.24) (1.19) (1.29) 
500 or more employees 0.235 0.220 0.215 
 (1.94) (1.84) (1.78) 
Owner-managed 0.309 0.302 0.323 
 (1.87) (1.84) (1.93) 
Public sector -0.041 -0.095 -0.039 
 (0.23) (0.51) (0.21) 
Country of ownership (ref.:  UK)    
Foreign-owned 0.062 0.074 0.040 
 (0.33) (0.39) (0.21) 
50/50 ownership  1.684 1.628 1.640 
 (4.79)** (4.49)** (4.60)** 
Single independent workplace 0.065 0.052 0.077 
 (0.46) (0.38) (0.56) 
Standard industrial classification (ref.:  
wholesale/retail distribution) 
   
Manufacturing 0.134 0.146 0.173 
 (0.66) (0.71) 0.336 
Electricity, gas, water 0.956 0.979 0.932 
 (3.90)** (3.94)** (3.71)** 
Construction 0.350 0.390 0.357 
 (1.28) (1.42) (1.31) 
Hotels and restaurants 0.519 0.580 0.554 
 (2.33)* (2.63)** (2.52)* 
Transport and communication 0.237 0.197 0.255 
 (1.12) (0.90) (1.18) 
Financial services 0.239 0.217 0.219 
 (0.86) (0.76) (0.76) 
Other business services 0.383 0.442 0.376 
 (1.99)* (2.28)* (1.94) 
Public administration 0.524 0.528 0.523 
 (1.98)* (2.02)* (1.96) 
Education 0.857 0.890 0.899 
 (3.39)** (3.64)** (3.57)** 
Health 0.293 0.317 (0.84) 
 (1.30) (1.42) (1.51) 
Other community services 0.456 0.482 0.443 
 (1.79) (1.91) (1.77) 
Workplace activity (ref.:  produces goods or 
services for customers) 
   
Supplier to other companies -0.015 0.028 -0.004 
 (0.11) (0.20) (0.03) 
Supplier to other parts of the organisation 0.167 0.159 0.152 
 (0.73) (0.72) (0.68) 
Does not produce for open market  -0.095 -0.112 -0.064 
 (0.67) (0.77) (0.45) 
Administrative office 0.243 0.217 0.226 
 (0.96) (0.85) (0.84) 
Age of workplace (ref.:  3-20 years)     
Under 3 years -0.294 -0.293 -0.293 
 (1.66) (1.69) (1.68) 
Over 20 years -0.243 -0.263 -0.245 
 (2.35)* (2.51)* (2.38)* 
Built on greenfield site in last 10 years -0.041 -0.035 -0.033 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) 
Standard statistical region (ref.:  rest of South 
East 
   
East Anglia 0.216 0.236 0.185 
 (1.11) (1.18) (0.94) 
East Midlands 0.420 0.451 0.407 
 (2.05)* (2.15)* (1.98)* 
London 0.530 0.535 0.534 
 (2.81)** (2.84)** (2.87)** 
North 0.671 0.706 0.668 
 (3.72)** (3.85)** (3.68)** 
North West  0.516 0.528 0.510 
 (2.81)** (2.88)** (2.79)** 
Scotland 0.291 0.300 0.270 
 (1.56) (1.59) (1.47) 
South West  0.075 0.211 0.125 
 (0.36) (1.01) (0.58) 
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Wales 0.728 0.763 0.697 
 (3.17)** (3.35)** (3.08)** 
West Midlands 0.572 0.601 0.568 
 (2.76)** (2.85)** (2.80)** 
Yorks and Humberside 0.290 0.282 0.297 
 (1.51) (1.48) (1.57) 
Management practices:    
HRM score 0.022 0.020 0.026 
 (0.90) (0.78) (1.06) 
Number of direct voice channels -0.034 -0.044 -0.037 
 (0.60) (0.78) (0.66) 
IiP award 0.341 0.331 0.328 
 (3.32)** (3.08)** (3.16)** 
cut1:Constant -1.995 -1.888 -2.047 
 (6.10)** (5.41)** (5.89)** 
cut2:Constant -1.163 -1.072 -1.208 
 (3.67)** (3.09)** (3.58)** 
cut3:Constant 0.584 0.691 0.532 
 (1.76) (1.94) (1.51) 
Observations 1960 1954 1961 
F (57,1833) 
= 4.88 
(59,1825)
= 4.76 
(59,1832)
= 4.85 
 
Notes:  (1) absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (2) * is significant at 95 per cent  ** is significant at 
99 per cent.   
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Appendix Table 5:  Employee Perceptions of Climate:  Union Strength 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Union measures:        
Union recognition -0.072       
 (1.86)       
On-site representation (ref.:  
recognised union with on-site 
representation) 
       
No recognition, no on-site rep  0.118      
  (2.71)**      
Recognition, no on-site rep  0.135      
  (2.76)**      
Union density (ref.:  zero)        
1-24%   -0.062     
   (1.30)     
25-49%   -0.103     
   (1.76)     
50-74%   -0.073     
   (1.28)     
75-99%   -0.139     
   (2.27)*     
100%   -0.252     
   (1.92)     
Members, but don’t know %   -0.063     
   (0.84)     
Bargaining coverage (ref.:  zero)        
100%    -0.014    
    (0.34)    
80-99%    -0.131    
    (2.68)**    
60-79%    -0.083    
    (1.17)    
40-59%    0.009    
    (0.10)    
20-39%    0.001    
    (0.02)    
1-19%    -0.117    
    (1.68)    
Number of recognised unions (ref.:  
none) 
       
One     -0.057   
     (1.35)   
Two     -0.090   
     (1.79)   
Three or more     -0.123   
     (2.47)*   
Collective bargaining arrangements 
(ref.:  joint bargaining) 
       
Single union      -0.011  
      (0.24)  
Separate bargaining, each union      -0.167  
      (3.43)**  
Separate bargaining, groups of 
unions 
      
-0.044 
 
      (0.65)  
Multi-union, arrangement missing      0.033  
      (0.28)  
No recognition      0.042  
      (0.87)  
Union and non-union voice (ref.:  no 
voice) 
       
Union voice only        -0.112 
       (1.13) 
Union and non-union voice       -0.159 
       (2.11)* 
Non-union voice only        -0.096 
       (1.35) 
Demographics: 
       
Female 0.074 0.079 0.077 0.081 0.075 0.075 0.078 
 (2.77)** (2.91)** (2.84)** (2.95)** (2.81)** (2.80)** (2.87)** 
Age of respondent (ref.:  30-39)        
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Under 20 years 0.114 0.120 0.109 0.108 0.116 0.116 0.135 
 (1.55) (1.64) (1.47) (1.43) (1.59) (1.58) (1.85) 
20-24 years 0.137 0.142 0.130 0.134 0.138 0.135 0.149 
 (2.97)** (3.06)** (2.81)** (2.87)** (3.00)** (2.93)** (3.22)** 
25-29 years 0.052 0.054 0.047 0.052 0.054 0.050 0.045 
 (1.52) (1.54) (1.36) (1.47) (1.56) (1.46) (1.28) 
40-49 years 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.025 
 (0.90) (0.91) (0.81) (1.10) (0.94) (0.87) (1.01) 
50-59 years 0.088 0.088 0.083 0.093 0.089 0.086 0.090 
 (2.62)** (2.61)** (2.45)* (2.72)** (2.66)** (2.54)* (2.67)** 
60+ years 0.470 0.463 0.465 0.479 0.472 0.465 0.464 
 (8.28)** (8.08)** (8.13)** (8.28)** (8.29)** (8.23)** (8.01)** 
Highest educational qualification 
(ref.:  GCSE or equivalent) 
       
No educational qualifications 0.202 0.204 0.206 0.199 0.202 0.203 0.205 
 (6.51)** (6.51)** (6.61)** (6.27)** (6.50)** (6.56)** (6.52)** 
CSE or equivalent 0.136 0.138 0.138 0.144 0.136 0.138 0.139 
 (3.56)** (3.62)** (3.59)** (3.71)** (3.56)** (3.64)** (3.65)** 
A level or equivalent -0.051 -0.049 -0.049 -0.044 -0.051 -0.049 -0.043 
 (1.53) (1.45) (1.44) (1.30) (1.54) (1.47) (1.32) 
Degree or equivalent -0.062 -0.053 -0.062 -0.055 -0.065 -0.059 -0.059 
 (1.73) (1.44) (1.71) (1.47) (1.78) (1.64) (1.64) 
Post -graduate degree -0.137 -0.138 -0.137 -0.138 -0.141 -0.133 -0.148 
 (2.84)** (2.79)** (2.80)** (2.81)** (2.89)** (2.75)** (2.98)** 
Has vocational qualification -0.035 -0.038 -0.038 -0.042 -0.035 -0.034 -0.038 
 (1.62) (1.73) (1.73) (1.89) (1.62) (1.55) (1.74) 
Member of non-white ethnic minority  
0.139 
 
0.149 
 
0.139 
 
0.141 
 
0.138 
 
0.137 
 
0.163 
 (2.32)* (2.48)* (2.33)* (2.29)* (2.30)* (2.28)* (2.73)** 
Union membership (ref.:  current 
member)  
       
Ex-member 0.110 0.104 0.100 0.107 0.106 0.109 0.109 
 (3.46)** (3.22)** (3.14)** (3.33)** (3.29)** (3.40)** (3.36)** 
Never member 0.249 0.240 0.239 0.245 0.245 0.249 0.251 
 (8.25)** (7.80)** (7.79)** (7.86)** (8.01)** (8.20)** (8.21)** 
        
Job characteristics:        
Occupational classification (ref.:  
clerical and secretarial) 
       
Managers/senior administrators 0.258 0.260 0.268 0.251 0.256 0.265 0.266 
 (5.44)** (5.44)** (5.65)** (5.21)** (5.42)** (5.60)** (5.60)** 
Professional 0.008 0.016 0.016 -0.008 0.006 0.012 0.023 
 (0.16) (0.33) (0.32) (0.15) (0.13) (0.24) (0.46) 
Associate professional/technical -0.003 -0.004 0.010 -0.015 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.20) (0.29) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) 
Craft and skilled service -0.166 -0.162 -0.159 -0.165 -0.165 -0.167 -0.164 
 (3.10)** (3.00)** (2.94)** (2.99)** (3.09)** (3.12)** (3.05)** 
Personal and protective service -0.001 -0.010 0.012 0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.19) (0.24) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.14) 
Sales 0.070 0.074 0.075 0.059 0.070 0.070 0.048 
 (1.10) (1.16) (1.18) (0.92) (1.10) (1.10) (0.82) 
Operative and assembly -0.203 -0.200 -0.202 -0.206 -0.204 -0.201 -0.202 
 (4.07)** (4.01)** (3.99)** (4.06)** (4.08)** (4.02)** (4.02)** 
Other occupation -0.167 -0.163 -0.161 -0.162 -0.168 -0.157 -0.159 
 (3.08)** (3.00)** (3.01)** (2.96)** (3.11)** (2.94)** (2.96)** 
Workplace tenure (ref.:  10+ years)        
Less than one year 0.466 0.470 0.467 0.467 0.466 0.465 0.470 
 (12.19)** (12.12)** (12.13)** (12.01)** (12.21)** (12.16)** (12.11)** 
1, <2 years 0.211 0.211 0.214 0.209 0.210 0.211 0.202 
 (5.27)** (5.21)** (5.27)** (5.12)** (5.26)** (5.26)** (5.03)** 
2, <5 years 0.105 0.105 0.109 0.117 0.103 0.103 0.105 
 (3.64)** (3.65)** (3.77)** (4.10)** (3.61)** (3.61)** (3.64)** 
5, <10 years 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.036 
 (1.15) (1.21) (1.07) (1.13) (1.10) (1.10) (1.18) 
Permanent employment contract 0.029 0.019 0.032 0.026 0.031 0.030 0.017 
 (0.69) (0.45) (0.74) (0.59) (0.72) (0.69) (0.38) 
Usual weekly hours (ref.:  <10)        
10, <29 hours -0.085 -0.069 -0.090 -0.090 -0.083 -0.086 -0.075 
 (1.15) (0.91) (1.22) (1.19) (1.14) (1.18) (0.98) 
30+ hours -0.165 -0.145 -0.169 -0.179 -0.165 -0.168 -0.155 
 (2.01)* (1.71) (2.04)* (2.11)* (2.02)* (2.05)* (1.82) 
Gross weekly wage (ref.:  £141-180)        
£50 or less 0.176 0.182 0.171 0.162 0.177 0.178 0.182 
 (2.13)* 0.320 (2.06)* (1.92) (2.14)* 0.340 (2.14)* 
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£51-80 0.061 0.050 0.060 0.047 0.061 0.058 0.062 
 (0.99) (0.81) (0.98) (0.77) (0.99) (0.95) (0.99) 
£81-140 0.076 0.073 0.078 0.074 0.075 0.076 0.077 
 (1.64) (1.57) (1.66) (1.56) (1.62) (1.64) (1.65) 
£181-220 0.047 0.042 0.048 0.043 0.047 0.051 0.046 
 (1.12) (0.99) (1.13) (1.01) (1.12) (1.22) (1.08) 
£221-260 0.013 0.008 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.008 
 (0.29) (0.17) (0.32) (0.16) (0.32) (0.39) (0.17) 
£261-310 0.074 0.074 0.079 0.075 0.078 0.080 0.077 
 (1.66) (1.63) (1.72) (1.63) (1.73) (1.78) (1.70) 
£311-360 0.118 0.117 0.119 0.133 0.123 0.119 0.113 
 (2.18)* (2.12)* (2.19)* (2.39)* (2.27)* (2.19)* (2.07)* 
£361-430 0.138 0.147 0.133 0.156 0.144 0.139 0.146 
 (2.81)** (2.95)** (2.69)** (3.14)** (2.93)** (2.85)** (2.93)** 
£431-540 0.178 0.173 0.184 0.183 0.182 0.178 0.179 
 (3.04)** (2.90)** (3.11)** (3.09)** (3.12)** (3.04)** (3.01)** 
£541-680 0.342 (2.14)* 0.321 0.349 0.345 (2.14)* 0.338 
 (5.26)** (4.86)** (4.95)** (5.31)** (5.30)** (5.27)** (5.23)** 
£681 or more 0.487 0.472 0.476 0.503 0.493 0.492 0.483 
 (6.22)** (5.97)** (6.04)** (6.35)** (6.31)** (6.29)** (6.09)** 
        
Workforce composition:        
Number of employees at workplace 
(ref.:  100-199) 
       
10-24 0.222 0.194 0.220 0.215 0.218 0.218 0.222 
 (3.08)** (2.61)** (3.09)** (2.91)** (3.02)** (3.05)** (3.05)** 
25-49 0.047 0.012 0.042 0.056 0.039 0.040 0.043 
 (0.82) (0.20) (0.74) (0.95) (0.68) (0.69) (0.73) 
50-99 0.111 0.087 0.113 0.127 0.105 0.104 0.107 
 (2.23)* (1.72) (2.26)* (2.49)* (2.12)* (2.09)* (2.13)* 
200-499 0.020 0.012 0.015 0.025 0.015 0.009 0.020 
 (0.43) (0.27) (0.33) (0.53) (0.33) (0.20) (0.44) 
500 or more 0.050 0.058 0.060 0.057 0.058 0.040 0.038 
 (1.20) (1.39) (1.44) (1.36) (1.42) (0.98) (0.91) 
Number of occupations -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.36) (0.26) (0.56) (0.82) (0.25) (0.31) (0.39) 
% managers who are women (ref.:  
under 50%) 
       
None -0.055 -0.058 -0.045 -0.068 -0.054 -0.051 -0.055 
 (1.34) (1.41) (1.10) (1.66) (1.31) (1.26) (1.32) 
50-99% -0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.01) (0.05) (0.28) 
100% 0.054 0.054 0.066 0.067 0.058 0.061 0.054 
 (0.78) (0.76) (0.94) (0.95) (0.84) (0.89) (0.76) 
No managers at  workplace 0.004 -0.021 0.008 -0.007 0.007 0.004 -0.047 
 (0.06) (0.30) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.68) 
% employees who are women 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (2.17)* (1.82) (2.05)* (1.88) (2.02)* (2.10)* (2.07)* 
% employees working part-time (ref.:  
under 10%) 
       
None -0.082 -0.079 -0.099 -0.055 -0.082 -0.075 -0.085 
 (1.49) (1.44) (1.83) (0.99) (1.50) (1.39) (1.56) 
10-24% -0.048 -0.043 -0.055 -0.057 -0.048 -0.034 -0.053 
 (0.97) (0.87) (1.12) (1.14) (0.97) (0.71) (1.06) 
25-49% 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.012 0.008 0.012 -0.006 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.05) (0.20) (0.13) (0.20) (0.11) 
50-74% 0.024 0.019 0.011 0.018 0.021 0.032 0.012 
 (0.36) (0.28) (0.16) (0.26) (0.31) (0.47) (0.17) 
75% or more 0.078 0.075 0.055 0.063 0.078 0.090 0.078 
 (0.92) (0.88) (0.65) (0.73) (0.91) (1.06) (0.91) 
% employees who are non-white 
(ref.:  none) 
       
Under 5% -0.084 -0.096 -0.086 -0.075 -0.081 -0.073 -0.092 
 (2.47)* (2.79)** (2.49)* (2.14)* (2.38)* (2.16)* (2.65)** 
5-10% -0.131 -0.138 -0.138 -0.121 -0.130 -0.117 -0.148 
 (2.34)* (2.43)* (2.44)* (2.09)* (2.30)* (2.08)* (2.64)** 
11-19% -0.178 -0.210 -0.183 -0.183 -0.175 -0.183 -0.190 
 (3.22)** (3.67)** (3.31)** (3.28)** (3.18)** (3.31)** (3.42)** 
20% or more -0.217 -0.246 -0.213 -0.172 -0.210 -0.214 -0.249 
 (2.64)** (3.05)** (2.57)* (2.18)* (2.56)* (2.61)** (3.12)** 
        
Workplace characteristics:        
Public sector -0.005 -0.002 0.000 -0.042 0.008 -0.007 0.003 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.00) (0.71) (0.14) (0.13) (0.05) 
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Country of ownership (ref.:  100% 
UK) 
       
Foreign-owned 0.042 0.041 0.047 0.064 0.047 0.046 0.031 
 (0.86) (0.84) (0.96) (1.32) (0.96) (0.96) (0.64) 
50/50 0.207 0.208 0.206 0.226 0.215 0.207 0.217 
 (1.91) (1.91) (1.88) (2.24)* (1.97)* (1.94) (1.90) 
Single independent workplace 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.011 
 (0.30) (0.25) (0.14) (0.46) (0.36) (0.45) (0.26) 
Standard industrial classification 
(ref.:  manufacturing) 
       
Electricity, gas and water 0.074 0.094 0.081 0.070 0.097 0.047 0.070 
 (1.07) (1.34) (1.13) (0.98) (1.38) (0.67) (1.00) 
Construction 0.171 0.157 0.147 0.170 0.171 0.154 0.161 
 (2.20)* (2.00)* (1.85) (2.06)* (2.20)* (1.99)* (2.08)* 
Wholesale and retail distribution -0.131 -0.131 -0.142 -0.122 -0.131 -0.145 -0.121 
 (1.78) (1.78) (1.88) (1.68) (1.77) (1.98)* (1.66) 
Hotels and restaurants 0.133 0.134 0.111 0.107 0.137 0.117 0.138 
 (1.50) (1.51) (1.21) (1.24) (1.53) (1.32) (1.55) 
Transport and communication -0.069 -0.065 -0.063 -0.080 -0.066 -0.054 -0.067 
 (1.06) (1.00) (0.97) (1.21) (1.02) (0.86) (1.03) 
Financial services 0.058 0.053 0.051 0.034 0.054 0.044 0.067 
 (0.79) (0.72) (0.69) (0.45) (0.73) (0.60) (0.90) 
Other business services 0.098 0.104 0.082 0.091 0.099 0.085 0.091 
 (1.48) (1.58) (1.19) (1.38) (1.48) (1.27) (1.39) 
Public administration 0.102 0.114 0.085 0.083 0.107 0.126 0.102 
 (1.34) (1.49) (1.12) (1.04) (1.40) (1.65) (1.32) 
Education 0.190 0.182 0.198 0.204 0.193 0.180 0.184 
 (2.30)* (2.16)* (2.41)* (2.40)* (2.34)* (2.19)* (2.21)* 
Health 0.024 0.038 0.018 0.019 0.035 0.010 0.041 
 (0.29) (0.45) (0.22) (0.23) (0.42) (0.11) (0.49) 
Other community services 0.114 0.107 0.117 0.117 0.115 0.093 0.115 
 (1.12) (1.03) (1.12) (1.13) (1.12) (0.91) (1.13) 
Workplace activity (ref.:  produces 
goods/services for customers)  
       
Supplier to other companies -0.046 -0.052 -0.057 -0.053 -0.049 -0.052 -0.052 
 (1.07) (1.21) (1.35) (1.20) (1.15) (1.22) (1.22) 
Supplier to other parts of the 
organisation 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.016 
 
0.005 
 
-0.017 
 
0.000 
 
0.005 
 
-0.005 
 (0.11) (0.29) (0.09) (0.30) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09) 
Does not produce for the open 
market  
 
0.043 
 
0.031 
 
0.052 
 
0.031 
 
0.044 
 
0.036 
 
0.035 
 (1.04) (0.71) (1.23) (0.73) (1.06) (0.86) (0.83) 
Administrative office only  0.068 0.064 0.058 0.057 0.068 0.068 0.060 
 (0.96) (0.91) (0.82) (0.79) (0.96) (0.96) (0.85) 
Age of workplace at current address 
(ref.:  more than 20 yrs)  
       
Under 3 years -0.111 -0.117 -0.118 -0.110 -0.114 -0.115 -0.121 
 (1.60) (1.69) (1.74) (1.58) (1.64) (1.72) (1.72) 
Between 3 and 20 years 0.038 0.029 0.040 0.041 0.034 0.034 0.031 
 (1.15) (0.87) (1.20) (1.24) (1.02) (1.04) (0.93) 
Respondent to managerial interview 
is an ER specialist 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.104 
 
-0.104 
 
-0.099 
 
-0.104 
 
-0.102 
 (2.91)** (2.89)** (2.93)** (2.92)** (2.82)** (2.92)** (2.88)** 
HRM score 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 
 (1.03) (0.96) (0.90) (0.99) (1.06) (1.16) (1.04) 
Number of direct voice channels 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.038 
 (1.32) (1.18) (1.19) (0.95) (1.35) (1.22) (2.02)* 
IiP award 0.094 0.092 0.110 0.099 0.093 0.094 0.089 
 (3.32)** (3.24)** (3.79)** (3.50)** (3.30)** (3.35)** (3.11)** 
Region (ref.:  rest of South East)        
East Anglia 0.025 0.008 0.037 0.015 0.023 0.047 0.019 
 (0.38) (0.12) 0.040 0.025 0.023 (0.68) 0.002 
East Midlands 0.122 0.120 0.134 0.088 0.122 0.145 0.130 
 (2.11)* (2.04)* (2.30)* (1.48) (2.09)* (2.50)* (2.20)* 
London 0.112 0.113 0.120 0.093 0.113 0.130 0.126 
 (1.82) (1.82) (1.94) (1.54) (1.84) (2.15)* (2.05)* 
North 0.059 0.051 0.099 0.050 0.068 0.066 0.061 
 (0.91) (0.80) (1.44) (0.77) (1.05) (1.01) (0.93) 
North West  0.100 0.093 0.119 0.085 0.105 0.106 0.105 
 (1.84) (1.67) (2.18)* (1.48) (1.95) (1.95) (1.92) 
Scotland -0.022 -0.025 -0.004 -0.041 -0.016 -0.016 -0.019 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.07) (0.67) (0.26) (0.27) (0.31) 
South West  0.172 0.176 0.182 0.151 0.176 0.169 0.178 
 (2.75)** (2.79)** (2.93)** (2.42)* (2.81)** (2.71)** (2.84)** 
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Wales 0.172 0.147 0.191 0.149 0.177 0.173 0.145 
 (2.49)* (2.10)* (2.71)** (2.07)* (2.55)* (2.52)* (2.03)* 
West Midlands 0.110 0.107 0.117 0.114 0.112 0.110 0.122 
 (1.90) (1.82) (1.98)* (1.93) (1.94) (1.90) (2.07)* 
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.020 0.008 (0.57) (0.23) (0.35) 0.027 (0.29) 
 (0.33) (0.13) (0.66) (0.41) (0.38) (0.45) (0.03) 
cut1:Constant -1.119 -1.055 -1.162 -1.180 -1.118 -1.075 -1.200 
 (6.60)** (6.21)** (6.62)** (6.83)** (6.60)** (6.36)** (6.76)** 
cut2:Constant -0.410 -0.344 -0.458 -0.468 -0.408 -0.363 -0.489 
 (2.43)* (2.03)* (2.62)** (2.73)** (2.42)* (2.15)* (2.76)** 
cut3:Constant 0.443 0.509 0.397 0.384 0.444 0.490 0.363 
 (2.63)** (3.02)** (2.28)* (2.24)* (2.64)** (2.91)** (2.06)* 
cut4:Constant 1.717 1.784 1.667 1.658 1.718 1.764 1.641 
 (10.24)** (10.60)** (9.61)** (9.72)** (10.26)** (10.47)** (9.35)** 
Observations 22451 21911 22147 21688 22451 22451 21954 
F 98,1414 
=16.37 
99,1374 = 
15.76 
103,1392 
= 15.81 
103,1355 
= 16.17 
100,1412 
= 16.18 
102,1410 
= 16.02 
100,1375 
= 15.76 
 
Notes:  (1) absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (2) * is significant at 95 per cent ** is significant at 
99 per cent. 
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Appendix Table 6:  Employees’ Perceptions of Climate:  Managerial Support for Unions and Union 
Effectiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Union measures:       
Managerial endorsement of union membership 
(ref.:  no union recognition) 
      
Recognition, no management recommendation 
of membership, no closed shop 
 
 
-0.071 
     
 (1.79)      
Recognition, management strongly 
recommends membership 
 
0.071 
     
 (1.13)      
Recognition, closed shop -0.053      
 (0.29)      
Union recognition  -0.289 -0.060 -0.043 -0.072 -0.068 
  (7.02)** (1.43) (1.05) (1.84) (1.69) 
Employee perceptions of management 
attitudes to union membership (ref.:  neutral) 
      
In favour   0.417     
  (13.14)**     
Not in favour   -0.610     
  (22.14)**     
Other answer  0.027     
  (0.18)     
Union takes notice of members’ problems and 
complaints (ref.:  neither agree nor disagree) 
      
Not applicable, no members      0.038 
      (0.62) 
Members, but respondent not aware of them       
0.057 
      (1.28) 
Strongly agree      0.204 
      (3.07)** 
Agree      0.129 
      (3.46)** 
Disagree      -0.466 
      (7.90)** 
Strongly disagree      -0.934 
      (7.02)** 
Other answer      -0.154 
      (0.91) 
Union taken seriously by management (ref.:  
neither agree nor disagree) 
      
Not applicable, no members     0.080  
     (1.37)  
Members, but respondent not aware of them      
0.100 
 
     (2.56)*  
Strongly agree     0.643  
     (7.81)**  
Agree     0.348  
     (9.55)**  
Disagree     -0.514  
     (13.00)**  
Strongly disagree     -1.285  
     (15.77)**  
Other answer     -0.133  
     (0.81)  
Employer would rather consult directly with 
employees than with unions (ref.:  neither 
agree nor disagree) 
      
Strongly agree    0.107   
    (2.20)*   
Agree    -0.017   
    (0.40)   
Disagree    -0.013   
    (0.31)   
Strongly disagree    -0.015   
    (0.22)   
Management attitudes to union membership 
(ref.:  neutral) 
      
In favour of membership    0.023    
   (0.64)    
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Not in favour    0.080    
   (1.50)    
Not an issue   0.377    
   (3.15)**    
Other answers   0.155    
   (1.46)    
Demographics:       
Female 0.072 0.071 0.073 0.074 0.052 0.076 
 (2.68)** (2.48)* (2.72)** (2.76)** (1.90) (2.86)** 
Age of respondent (ref.:  30-39)       
Under 20 years 0.114 0.042 0.111 0.110 0.075 0.100 
 (1.55) (0.57) (1.51) (1.51) (1.01) (1.36) 
20-24 years 0.141 0.071 0.132 0.135 0.109 0.133 
 (3.05)** (1.46) (2.86)** (2.93)** (2.36)* (2.89)** 
25-29 years 0.051 0.008 0.049 0.053 0.018 0.041 
 (1.48) (0.21) (1.43) (1.55) (0.49) (1.18) 
40-49 years 0.021 -0.004 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.010 
 (0.83) (0.16) (0.91) (0.91) (0.90) (0.40) 
50-59 years 0.084 0.058 0.084 0.090 0.071 0.078 
 (2.50)* (1.79) (2.51)* (2.69)** (2.19)* (2.32)* 
60+ years 0.468 0.365 0.465 0.469 0.442 0.446 
 (8.23)** (5.69)** (8.14)** (8.26)** (7.98)** (7.72)** 
Highest educational qualification (ref.:  GCSE 
or equivalent) 
      
No educational qualifications 0.203 0.199 0.201 0.203 0.196 0.202 
 (6.52)** (5.83)** (6.48)** (6.54)** (6.25)** (6.41)** 
CSE or equivalent 0.135 0.142 0.133 0.139 0.141 0.143 
 (3.51)** (3.46)** (3.48)** (3.64)** (3.58)** (3.75)** 
A level or equivalent -0.052 -0.059 -0.051 -0.051 -0.037 -0.043 
 (1.54) (1.62) (1.52) (1.54) (1.10) (1.30) 
Degree or equivalent -0.069 -0.067 -0.063 -0.059 -0.061 -0.058 
 (1.94) (1.76) (1.75) (1.63) (1.68) (1.56) 
Post -graduate degree -0.150 -0.114 -0.144 -0.129 -0.136 -0.136 
 (3.21)** (2.25)* (3.01)** (2.67)** (2.83)** (2.80)** 
Has vocational qualification -0.035 -0.018 -0.034 -0.035 -0.025 -0.035 
 (1.63) (0.78) (1.57) (1.60) (1.12) (1.61) 
Member of non-white ethnic minority 0.138 0.176 0.135 0.139 0.144 0.138 
 (2.30)* (3.03)** (2.25)* (2.33)* (2.33)* (2.27)* 
Union membership (ref.:  current member)        
Ex-member 0.117 0.188 0.112 0.109 0.134 0.150 
 (3.68)** (5.70)** (3.47)** (3.42)** (4.12)** (4.60)** 
Never member 0.258 0.323 0.247 0.247 0.263 0.273 
 (8.54)** (10.15)** (8.23)** (8.07)** (9.01)** (9.12)** 
       
Job characteristics:       
Occupational classification (ref.:  clerical and 
secretarial) 
      
Managers/senior administrators 0.256 0.235 0.258 0.258 0.251 0.267 
 (5.43)** (4.68)** (5.46)** (5.45)** (5.24)** (5.51)** 
Professional 0.015 0.015 0.001 0.005 0.053 0.023 
 (0.32) (0.30) (0.01) (0.10) (1.12) (0.47) 
Associate professional/technical -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.006 0.004 0.000 
 (0.02) (0.11) (0.00) (0.12) (0.07) (0.01) 
Craft and skilled service -0.166 -0.153 -0.164 -0.169 -0.154 -0.158 
 (3.10)** (2.64)** (3.04)** (3.17)** (2.68)** (2.94)** 
Personal and protective service 0.003 0.049 0.000 -0.005 0.028 0.009 
 (0.07) (0.93) (0.01) (0.11) (0.57) (0.18) 
Sales 0.072 0.045 0.084 0.071 0.080 0.088 
 (1.13) (0.75) (1.32) (1.11) (1.23) (1.39) 
Operative and assembly -0.202 -0.210 -0.197 -0.205 -0.166 -0.191 
 (4.04)** (4.05)** (3.94)** (4.13)** (3.22)** (3.83)** 
Other occupation -0.161 -0.128 -0.161 -0.172 -0.141 -0.138 
 (2.98)** (2.27)* (2.97)** (3.17)** (2.66)** (2.55)* 
Workplace tenure (ref.:  10+ years)        
Less than one year 0.460 0.365 0.463 0.466 0.429 0.450 
 (12.04)** (9.08)** (12.14)** (12.24)** (11.21)** (11.68)** 
1, <2 years 0.209 0.150 0.209 0.209 0.180 0.197 
 (5.22)** (3.59)** (5.21)** (5.24)** (4.33)** (4.81)** 
2, <5 years 0.104 0.065 0.103 0.104 0.083 0.098 
 (3.64)** (2.19)* (3.56)** (3.64)** (2.89)** (3.37)** 
5, <10 years 0.034 0.014 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.035 
 (1.12) (0.46) (1.11) (1.15) (1.10) (1.14) 
Permanent employment contract 0.025 0.017 0.027 0.030 0.040 0.038 
 (0.57) (0.35) (0.62) (0.70) (0.92) (0.88) 
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Usual weekly hours (ref.:  <10)       
10, <29 hours -0.094 -0.093 -0.082 -0.083 -0.092 -0.089 
 (1.29) (1.13) (1.11) (1.15) (1.21) (1.21) 
30+ hours -0.180 -0.174 -0.162 -0.167 -0.157 -0.167 
 (2.23)* (1.88) (1.98)* (2.05)* (1.85) (2.05)* 
Gross weekly wage (ref.:  £141-180)       
£50 or less 0.165 0.190 0.179 0.175 0.188 0.171 
 (2.00)* 0.278 0.351 (2.13)* 0.291 0.325 
£51-80 0.056 0.056 0.061 0.061 0.059 0.043 
 (0.91) (0.83) (1.00) (1.00) (0.95) (0.70) 
£81-140 0.074 0.083 0.078 0.078 0.071 0.074 
 (1.60) (1.64) (1.68) (1.68) (1.54) (1.59) 
£181-220 0.047 0.056 0.048 0.048 0.038 0.041 
 (1.12) (1.28) (1.14) (1.15) (0.91) (0.96) 
£221-260 0.012 0.018 0.009 0.016 0.020 0.015 
 (0.27) (0.38) (0.20) (0.37) (0.45) (0.34) 
£261-310 0.072 0.062 0.075 0.077 0.060 0.066 
 (1.61) (1.33) (1.65) (1.72) (1.33) (1.46) 
£311-360 0.117 0.072 0.119 0.120 0.091 0.106 
 (2.17)* (1.30) (2.20)* (2.20)* (1.67) (1.95) 
£361-430 0.143 0.081 0.139 0.144 0.096 0.117 
 (2.93)** (1.63) (2.83)** (2.95)** (1.93) (2.39)* 
£431-540 0.177 0.152 0.188 0.179 0.144 0.168 
 (3.07)** (2.58)* (3.23)** (3.07)** (2.47)* (2.89)** 
£541-680 0.350 (2.19)* (2.15)* 0.336 (2.26)* (2.09)* 
 (5.50)** (4.28)** (5.48)** (5.22)** (4.55)** (5.06)** 
£681 or more 0.506 0.478 0.486 0.482 0.439 0.473 
 (6.74)** (5.81)** (6.23)** (6.21)** (5.71)** (6.03)** 
       
Workforce composition:       
Number of employees at workplace (ref.:  100-
199) 
      
10-24 0.221 0.195 0.224 0.219 0.193 0.222 
 (3.07)** (2.69)** (3.09)** (3.04)** (2.69)** (3.11)** 
25-49 0.041 0.051 0.030 0.040 0.030 0.048 
 (0.72) (0.87) (0.52) (0.69) (0.52) (0.83) 
50-99 0.103 0.123 0.103 0.110 0.104 0.113 
 (2.09)* (2.50)* (2.12)* (2.25)* (2.10)* (2.24)* 
200-499 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.016 0.000 0.017 
 (0.28) (0.41) (0.30) (0.34) (0.01) (0.37) 
500 or more 0.044 0.038 0.046 0.052 0.050 0.046 
 (1.07) (0.90) (1.12) (1.26) (1.20) (1.10) 
Number of occupations -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.60) (0.24) (0.29) (0.34) (0.77) (0.44) 
% managers who are women (ref.:  under 
50%) 
      
None -0.058 -0.050 -0.057 -0.050 -0.039 -0.053 
 (1.45) (1.24) (1.40) (1.22) (0.98) (1.30) 
50-99% -0.007 -0.016 -0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.17) (0.39) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) 
100% 0.055 -0.002 0.050 0.039 0.049 0.044 
 (0.81) (0.03) (0.72) (0.56) (0.70) (0.63) 
No managers at  workplace -0.021 0.010 0.029 0.011 -0.010 -0.002 
 (0.30) (0.14) (0.43) (0.16) (0.16) (0.03) 
% employees who are women 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (2.05)* (2.81)** (2.34)* (2.13)* (2.56)* (2.41)* 
% employees working part-time (ref.:  under 
10%) 
      
None -0.087 -0.089 -0.089 -0.078 -0.087 -0.088 
 (1.62) (1.64) (1.61) (1.42) (1.64) (1.61) 
10-24% -0.049 -0.089 -0.032 -0.044 -0.053 -0.049 
 (0.96) (1.80) (0.64) (0.90) (1.07) (0.98) 
25-49% 0.008 -0.028 0.023 0.017 -0.013 0.004 
 (0.13) (0.47) (0.38) (0.29) (0.22) (0.07) 
50-74% 0.022 -0.048 0.039 0.016 0.012 0.021 
 (0.33) (0.69) (0.58) (0.23) (0.17) (0.31) 
75% or more 0.075 -0.043 0.096 0.090 0.055 0.071 
 (0.88) (0.46) (1.12) (1.07) (0.65) (0.83) 
% employees who are non-white (ref.:  none)       
Under 5% -0.085 -0.080 -0.075 -0.090 -0.089 -0.091 
 (2.51)* (2.28)* (2.20)* (2.63)** (2.56)* (2.66)** 
5-10% -0.120 -0.132 -0.119 -0.137 -0.141 -0.144 
 (2.16)* (2.29)* (2.14)* (2.47)* (2.50)* (2.57)* 
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11-19% -0.174 -0.147 -0.166 -0.183 -0.201 -0.196 
 (3.19)** (2.64)** (2.93)** (3.29)** (3.52)** (3.53)** 
20% or more -0.227 -0.202 -0.207 -0.220 -0.226 -0.232 
 (2.80)** (2.31)* (2.55)* (2.66)** (2.79)** (2.84)** 
       
Workplace characteristics:       
Public sector -0.017 -0.053 -0.016 -0.001 -0.041 -0.005 
 (0.30) (0.94) (0.29) (0.02) (0.73) (0.08) 
Country of ownership (ref.:  100% UK)       
Foreign-owned 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.044 0.029 0.035 
 (0.66) (0.64) (0.62) (0.91) (0.60) (0.73) 
50/50 0.196 0.175 0.138 0.247 0.221 0.219 
 (1.86) (1.81) (1.68) (2.23)* (1.94) (2.02)* 
Single independent workplace 0.019 0.023 -0.009 0.004 0.011 0.005 
 (0.47) (0.56) (0.21) (0.09) (0.27) (0.11) 
Standard industrial classification (ref.:  
manufacturing) 
      
Electricity, gas and water 0.067 0.038 0.079 0.084 0.085 0.080 
 (0.97) (0.56) (1.15) (1.23) (1.24) (1.16) 
Construction 0.170 0.128 0.178 0.180 0.162 0.174 
 (2.19)* (1.65) (2.31)* (2.28)* (2.01)* (2.18)* 
Wholesale and retail distribution -0.135 -0.126 -0.149 -0.117 -0.123 -0.136 
 (1.82) (1.66) (2.06)* (1.57) (1.60) (1.80) 
Hotels and restaurants 0.136 0.056 0.140 0.158 0.171 0.149 
 (1.53) (0.63) (1.58) (1.78) (1.88) (1.67) 
Transport and communication -0.072 -0.083 -0.072 -0.064 -0.060 -0.065 
 (1.10) (1.33) (1.12) (1.00) (0.94) (1.01) 
Financial services 0.055 0.073 0.050 0.068 0.090 0.047 
 (0.74) (0.99) (0.68) (0.94) (1.19) (0.64) 
Other business services 0.096 0.052 0.097 0.104 0.114 0.096 
 (1.44) (0.78) (1.47) (1.58) (1.61) (1.39) 
Public administration 0.118 0.060 0.108 0.118 0.153 0.100 
 (1.54) (0.78) (1.41) (1.53) (1.95) (1.29) 
Education 0.171 0.081 0.199 0.197 0.189 0.167 
 (2.03)* (0.97) (2.41)* (2.37)* (2.28)* (2.01)* 
Health 0.012 -0.032 0.022 0.045 0.037 0.023 
 (0.14) (0.37) (0.26) (0.53) (0.43) (0.28) 
Other community services 0.111 0.086 0.111 0.143 0.148 0.113 
 (1.08) (0.81) (1.06) (1.40) (1.41) (1.10) 
Workplace activity (ref.:  produces 
goods/services for customers) 
      
Supplier to other companies -0.046 -0.021 -0.037 -0.044 -0.030 -0.037 
 (1.07) (0.49) (0.87) (1.04) (0.70) (0.86) 
Supplier to other parts of the organisation -0.012 -0.027 -0.004 -0.002 -0.042 -0.011 
 (0.22) (0.49) (0.07) (0.03) (0.81) (0.20) 
Does not produce for the open market  0.051 0.048 0.039 0.041 0.056 0.049 
 (1.25) (1.09) (0.94) (0.98) (1.36) (1.18) 
Administrative office only  0.065 0.069 0.063 0.072 0.056 0.060 
 (0.93) (0.89) (0.91) (1.03) (0.79) (0.83) 
Age of workplace at current address (ref.:  
more than 20 yrs)  
      
Under 3 years -0.087 -0.067 -0.104 -0.110 -0.095 -0.109 
 (1.26) (0.98) (1.51) (1.60) (1.41) (1.59) 
Between 3 and 20 years 0.044 0.051 0.040 0.034 0.042 0.033 
 (1.37) (1.56) (1.22) (1.04) (1.31) (1.00) 
Respondent to managerial interview is an ER 
specialist 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.107 
 
-0.109 
 
-0.100 
 
-0.089 
 
-0.094 
 (2.62)** (3.08)** (3.14)** (2.88)** (2.57)* (2.66)** 
HRM score 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.013 0.008 
 (1.01) (1.18) (0.88) (1.06) (1.46) (0.98) 
Number of direct voice channels 0.020 0.030 0.020 0.021 0.019 0.023 
 (1.25) (1.81) (1.22) (1.28) (1.15) (1.40) 
IiP award 0.097 0.047 0.091 0.096 0.082 0.091 
 (3.47)** (1.63) (3.24)** (3.41)** (2.92)** (3.25)** 
Region (ref.:  rest of South East)       
East Anglia 0.030 0.052 0.025 0.025 0.049 0.030 
 (0.46) (0.77) (0.38) 0.020 (0.75) (0.46) 
East Midlands 0.121 0.093 0.134 0.127 0.103 0.118 
 (2.11)* (1.60) (2.30)* (2.21)* (1.77) (2.04)* 
London 0.127 0.117 0.111 0.114 0.149 0.121 
 (2.09)* (1.95) (1.83) (1.84) (2.47)* (1.98)* 
North 0.063 0.059 0.064 0.071 0.064 0.063 
 (0.99) (0.85) (0.98) (1.09) (0.91) (0.98) 
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North West  0.097 0.097 0.096 0.099 0.090 0.101 
 (1.79) (1.83) (1.75) (1.83) (1.69) (1.84) 
Scotland -0.020 -0.051 -0.014 -0.020 -0.031 -0.026 
 (0.33) (0.86) (0.23) (0.34) (0.52) (0.43) 
South West  0.174 0.146 0.186 0.169 0.164 0.159 
 (2.83)** (2.33)* (3.02)** (2.73)** (2.66)** (2.54)* 
Wales 0.168 0.188 0.175 0.168 0.163 0.172 
 (2.46)* (2.64)** (2.50)* (2.36)* (2.35)* (2.45)* 
West Midlands 0.104 0.113 0.111 0.109 0.104 0.109 
 (1.78) (1.95) (1.93) (1.91) (1.74) (1.86) 
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.019 -0.020 0.027 (0.38) -0.001 0.009 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.46) (0.33) (0.02) (0.15) 
cut1:Constant -1.153 -1.509 -1.095 -1.080 -1.111 -1.085 
 (6.74)** (8.55)** (6.44)** (6.26)** (6.33)** (6.23)** 
cut2:Constant -0.443 -0.751 -0.385 -0.369 -0.354 -0.362 
 (2.60)** (4.27)** (2.28)* (2.15)* (2.03)* (2.10)* 
cut3:Constant 0.411 0.149 0.467 0.485 0.537 0.501 
 (2.42)* (0.84) (2.77)** (2.83)** (3.08)** (2.91)** 
cut4:Constant 1.686 1.471 1.743 1.759 1.838 1.780 
 (9.97)** (8.37)** (10.37)** (10.30)** (10.55)** (10.36)** 
Observations 22419 20567 22386 22451 22323 22321 
F 100,1410 
= 16.62 
101, 1407 
= 28.67 
102,1404 
= 16.89 
102,1410 
= 16.01 
105,1407 
= 26.96 
105,1407 
= 19.76 
 
Notes:  (1) absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (2) * is significant at 95 per cent ** is significant at 
99 per cent. 
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